Author(s): Ferreira, Manuel Alberto M. ; Coelho, Manuel ; Pedro, Maria Isabel
Date: 2012
Persistent ID: http://hdl.handle.net/10071/5941
Origin: Repositório ISCTE
Subject(s): Anti-commons theory; Property rights; Política comum da pesca -- Common fisheries policy
The problems raised by anti-commons and bureaucracy have been linked since the study of Buchanan & Yoon (2000). Bureaucracy involves a multitude of agents that have a deciding power. At the view of conflicting interests, the decision makers inertia or the inertia of the system itself, excessive administrative procedures or too many administrative circuits push for too late decisions, or for nonrational decisions in terms of value creation for economic agents.Property Rights Theory explains new concerns. Considering that an “anti-commons” problem arises when there are multiple rights to exclude, the problem of decision process in aquaculture projects makes sense at this level. However, little attention has been given to the setting where more than one person is assigned with exclusion rights, which may be exercised. “Anti-commons” problem is analyzed in situations in which resources are inefficiently under-utilized rather than over-utilized as in the familiar commons setting. In this study, fisheries problems are studied and some ways to deal with the problem are presented.
