Detalhes do Documento

Merger, partial collusion and relocation

Autor(es): Posada, Pedro cv logo 1 ; Straume, Odd Rune cv logo 2

Data: 2004

Identificador Persistente: http://hdl.handle.net/1822/6849

Origem: RepositóriUM - Universidade do Minho

Assunto(s): Spatial competition; Merger; Relocation; Partial collusion


Descrição
We set up a three-firm model of spatial competition to analyse how a merger affects the incentives for relocation, and conversely, how the possibility of relocation affects the profitability of the merger, particularly for the non-participating firm. We also consider the cases of partial collusion in either prices or locations. Under the assumption of mill pricing, we find that a merger will generally induce the merger participants to relocate, but the direction of relocation is ambiguous, and dependent on the degree of convexity in the consumers transportation cost function. Furthermore, we identify a set of parameter values for which the free-rider effect of a merger vanishes, implying that the possibility of relocation could solve the merger paradox.
Tipo de Documento Artigo
Idioma Inglês
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