After Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Wittgenstein realized that elementary propositions may logically conflict with each other, due to the fact that the most elementary measurements may contradict each other. This led to the view that logic consists of various calculi. A calculus consists of measurement scales, each scale being a rule for the application of numbers. These scales determine logical relationships between elementary propositions by reason of arithmetical relations. Attempts to reject Wittgenstein's change in viewpoint, which ignore the relevance of measurement and arithmetic, are remiss. In this light, I discuss Sarah Moss’s criticism of intermediate Wittgenstein.

I want to compose a positive definition of madness: the feeling of psychic commotion and vertigo resulting from the individual's perception of extra knowledge about himself. I will make a historical-philosophical and literary journey on the topic with some of the leading contemporary thinkers, from Kant and Pinel, Hegel, Hölderlin and Nietzsche, to Wittgenstein and Derrida. I present a different perspective from the current humanistic cultural convention that establishes a relationship of efficient causality between the nosological entity "schizophrenia" and the artistic production, arguing that the one who creates art is the individual, the artist, not an alleged psychic failure.

The main goal of this article is to compare a very important figure of contemporary philosophy, who we may consider relatively distant from us (Edmund Husserl, 1859-1938) with a living author (John Searle, b. 1932). Starting from an overview of John Searle´s philosophy of mind, including conceptions of intentionality and philosophy of language, we explore possible relations with Husserl. Although we also consider issues regarding consciousness and perception, the utlimate key for such relations is the reality of intentionality. The article finishes with a comparison between Husserl’s and Searle’s theories of knowledge.

This article tries to investigate what kind of listening is that of the one who "hears voices". It aims to show the effects that the analysis of certain auditory hallucinations and sound spectra would have, if it is carried out from the point of view of the listening, not of the content of what is heard. For this, the article connects the study of certain "auditory ghosts" with the analysis “ from the territory of fiction, specifically a novel by Robert Silverberg “ of the loss of the power of a telepath. It is thus intended to show a possible way of understanding how the listener listens to himself as if he were another, or, conversely, how he listens to another as if he were not surrounded by exteriority, but remained in the innermost part of oneself.

In its general outline, this text began by informing a lecture given at the IX ECATI Cycle under the title of The Constellation of the Planetarium. It was then a matter of stating how the cosmopolitanism rethought by Jacques Derrida really tries to respond, in a bold and just way, to the demend to "think under the mode of the constellation" (cf. W. Benjamim), at the same time emphasizing the implications of this demend at the level of the political and the instituted. Now improved and more substantiated, this text attemps to show, by highlighting not only the inestimable legacy but also thev limits, the powerlessness and the serious deficiencies of cosmopolitanism “ its main theoretical philosophical presuppositions of metaphysical nature “ how Jacques Derrida re-thinks it in terms of altermondialisation to come.

The author studies Kant’s impact on contemporary analytic philosophy and on its historiography from Frege, Russell, and Viennese logical positivism to some more recent reformulations of the Kantian problem concerning the analytic-‘synthetic distinction, and the possibility of the synthetic a priori, as is the case, among others, of Quine’s and Kripke’s. The reasons behind the return to Kant in analytic philosophy from the 1950s to the present (particularly what he calls "rejection versus acceptance of Kant") are analysed, showing how this return has focused (and it partly continues to focus) on the topicality of the above-‘mentioned problem and its implications.

This paper argues that Fichte, in his early works, apprehends the task of philosophy not as much as a Critique of Reason, but rather as a self-‘knowledge of Spirit, thereby bringing the notion of Spirit to the center of the philosophical discussion. We explore what Fichte means by Spirit and sustain that this notion, even if it is not used in a consistent way throughout his work, covers a fundamental conceptual space of his philosophical project. The argument will be structured as an exploration of each dimension of this conceptual space, namely: (i) the Spirit as self-‘relation; (ii) the Spirit as productive imagination; and (iii) the Spirit as the result of learning process grounded on the human drives.

This article aims to understand the reasons for the hermeneutics of testimony in P. Ricoeur. We try to show how this category, of an eminently ethical nature, is important in a reflection on the existence that does not start from the pure spontaneity of the cogito, but from the need for a mediate reflection on the human condition, that is, on its actions, decisions and ways of being in the world. There is no understanding for the philosopher that the subject may have of himself that is not mediated by signs, symbols and texts. Hence the ethical value of a hermeneutic recovery of the testimony, history, and treasure of the great symbols of the various cultures that have influenced us. It is the dialectic of the personal attestation of capacities in the exercise of witness and the hermeneutic and even metaphorical dimension of it that preserve the historical and ethical scope of memory. She keeps also openness to what has historically been left to be done and remains open at the level of the desirable ethical absolute.

The paper aims at showing how two 16th-‘century Portuguese philosophers’metaphysical (meaning, non-‘historical and non-‘cultural, but paying attention to the topics of the scientia transcendens and resolutio) exposition to imaginary space and time acquires its due relevance if read through a critical dialogue with Miguel B. Pereira’s interpretation, more under a Leibnizian than a Kantian perspective.