Anti-realism and logical expressivism

• Author(s): Ferreira, Acácio ; Silva, Marcos
• Date: 2021
• Origin: Oasisbr
• Document Type: Journal article
• Language: Portuguese

Description

In his work, Robert Brandom presents an expressivist theory about logic. According to him, logic plays the expressive role of making explicit inferential relations implicit in our linguistic practices. Inferential relations constitute the content of our concepts. In our paper, we explore the thesis that Brandom’s logical expressivism is an anti-realist theory about logic. Logical realists defend the independent existence of logical facts in relation to our cognitive and linguistic practices. In this view, logic truly describes the structure of reality, as it represents logical facts. By contrast, logical anti-realists do not commit to the independent existence of logical facts to understand the nature of logic. In contrast to a realist view, we show that Brandom’s anti-realism renders a simple and economic ontology and also the foundation of a pragmatist alternative to examine the normativity of logic, the phenomenon of rival logics and the nature of our rationality.

In his work, Robert Brandom presents an expressivist theory about logic. According to him, logic plays the expressive role of making explicit inferential relations implicit in our linguistic practices. Inferential relations constitute the content of our concepts. In our paper, we explore the thesis that Brandom’s logical expressivism is an anti-realist theory about logic. Logical realists defend the independent existence of logical facts in relation to our cognitive and linguistic practices. In this view, logic truly describes the structure of reality, as it represents logical facts. By contrast, logical anti-realists do not commit to the independent existence of logical facts to understand the nature of logic. In contrast to a realist view, we show that Brandom’s anti-realism renders a simple and economic ontology and also the foundation of a pragmatist alternative to examine the normativity of logic, the phenomenon of rival logics and the nature of our rationality.

Em sua obra, Robert Brandom apresenta uma teoria expressivista da lógica. Segundo o autor, a lógica tem o papel expressivo de tornar explı́citas as relações inferenciais implı́citas em nossas práticas linguı́sticas. Estas relações inferenciais conferem conteúdo aos conceitos. Neste artigo, exploraremos a tese de que o expressivismo lógico de Brandom é uma teoria antirrealista acerca da lógica. Realistas lógicos costumam defender a existência independente de fatos lógicos em relação a nossas práticas cognitivas e linguı́sticas, de modo que a lógica, uma vez que seria capaz de representar estes fatos, descreveria verdadeiramente a estrutura da realidade. Por contraste, antirrealistas lógicos não se comprometem com a existência independente de fatos lógicos para entenderem a natureza da lógica. Em contraste com uma visão realista, mostramos que o antirrealismo de Brandom tem como consequências uma ontologia simples e econômica e a fundação de uma alternativa pragmatista para se examinar a normatividade da lógica, o fenômeno da pluralidade de lógicas rivais e a natureza de nossa racionalidade.