Author(s): Martins, Ana Paula
Date: 2021
Persistent ID: http://hdl.handle.net/10400.14/38229
Origin: Veritati - Repositório Institucional da Universidade Católica Portuguesa
Subject(s): Two-person cooperative games; Cooperative games maximands; Opportunism; Pessimism
This paper suggests variations to the baseline Nash cooperative solution that take into account the Kalai-Smorodinsky critique. One the one hand, a CES form of the maximand is proven to accommodate both the generalized two-person Nash and the Kalai-Smorodinsky - as other proportional - solutions as special cases. As an alternative, a Stone-Geary formulation is forwarded, weighing both the distances to the threat and to the ideal point, along with the corresponding CES generalization. Interpretations of the implied equilibrium solutions – generalizable to n-person cooperative games – are provided, arising as equations balancing geometric averages of measures of attitude towards (large) risk(s) of the players.
