Identifying previously requested content by side-channel timing attack in NDN

• Author(s): Dogruluk, Ertugrul ; Costa, António ; Macedo, Joaquim
• Date: 2018
• Persistent ID: https://hdl.handle.net/1822/69257
• Origin: RepositóriUM - Universidade do Minho
• Subject(s): Content privacy; NDN; Side-channel timing attack
• Document Type: Conference paper
• Language: English
• Contributor(s): Universidade do Minho

Description

NDN is a new name-based network paradigm. It is designed to keep the contents in the cache to increase the network efficiency. However, previously requested content may put the user privacy at risk. The time difference between cached and non-cached contents of interest responses can be used by an adversary to determine previously requested contents in cache. This attack is classified as side-channel timing attack. In NDN, it is used a signature to authenticate interests and data packets. However, signed packets does not affect the performance of side-channel timing attack. Independently of being signed or not, the adversary may identify both the sensitive and non-sensitive contents, recently cached by router. In order to mitigate side-channel attacks in NDN, there are several countermeasure methods proposed by other researchers. In this work, firstly we developed an attack scenario using ndnSIM simulator. Then we evaluated the scenario under attack and without attacks. We also proposed an adversary detection algorithm that combines three different defense countermeasures in order to maximize the cache availability.