A countermeasure approach for brute-force timing attacks on cache privacy in named data networking architectures

• Author(s): Dogruluk, Ertugrul ; Macedo, Joaquim ; Costa, António
• Date: 2022
• Persistent ID: https://hdl.handle.net/1822/79804
• Origin: RepositóriUM - Universidade do Minho
• Subject(s): Named data networks; Cache privacy; Side-channel timing attacks
• Document Type: Journal article
• Language: English
• Contributor(s): Universidade do Minho

Description

One key feature of named data networks (NDN) is supporting in-network caching to increase the content distribution for today’s Internet needs. However, previously cached contents may be threatened by side-channel timing measurements/attacks. For example, one adversary can identify previously cached contents by distinguishing between uncached and cached contents from the in-network caching node, namely the edge NDN router. The attacks can be mitigated by the previously proposed methods effectively. However, these countermeasures may be against the NDN paradigm, affecting the content distribution performance. This work studied the side-channel timing attack on streaming over NDN applications and proposed a capable approach to mitigate it. Firstly, a recent side-channel timing attack, designated by brute-force, was implemented on ndnSIM using the AT&T network topology. Then, a multi-level countermeasure method, designated by detection and defense (DaD), is proposed to mitigate this attack. Simulation results showed that DaD distinguishes between legitimate and adversary nodes. During the attack, the proposed DaD multi-level approach achieved the minimum cache hit ratio (≈0.7%) compared to traditional countermeasures (≈4.1% in probabilistic and ≈3.7% in freshness) without compromising legitimate requests.