Endogenous spillovers in the trade-off between centralization and decentralization

• Author(s): Júlio, Paulo ; Peralta, Susana
• Date: 2008
• Persistent ID: http://hdl.handle.net/10362/11586
• Origin: Repositório Institucional da UNL
• Subject(s): Local public goods; Spillovers; Fiscal (de)centralization
• Document Type: Working paper
• Language: English
• Contributor(s): RUN

Description

In this paper, we revisit the classical trade-off between centralized and decentralized provision of local public goods, in a setting where interregional spillovers depend on the level of a national public good. We compare the standard benevolent planner approach with a political economy in which decisions, in a centralized system, are undertaken by a non-cooperative legislature with no separation of powers. We observe that the policy-maker in a centralized system is able to play both with local public goods and spillovers, a mechanism that is not available under a decentralized system. When compared to the traditional exogenous spillovers assumption, this improves the case for centralization under the standard benevolent planner approach. However, the same is not necessarily true in the non-cooperative legislature, as in this case the interests of the legislator do not need to be aligned with those of the society. Finally, we extend the traditional political economy analysis by considering a legislature in which decisions are undertaken by different committees (separation of powers), and show that it performs better than the original non-cooperative legislature, greatly improving the case for centralization.

Funda cão para a Ciência e Tecnologia (BD/36542/2007)