64 documents found, page 1 of 7

Bistability of Evolutionary Stable Vaccination Strategies in the Reinfection SI...

We use the reinfection SIRI epidemiological model to analyze the impact of education programs and vaccine scares on individuals decisions to vaccinate or not. The presence of the reinfection provokes the novelty of the existence of three Nash equilibria for the same level of the morbidity relative risk instead of a single Nash equilibrium as occurs in the SIR model studied by Bauch and Earn (PNAS 101:13391-1339...

NASH AND SOCIAL WELFARE IMPACT IN AN INTERNATIONAL TRADE MODEL

We study a classic international trade model consisting of a strategic game in the tariffs of the governments. The model is a two-stage game where, at the first stage, governments of each country use their welfare functions to choose their tariffs either (i) competitively (Nash equilibrium) or (ii) cooperatively (social optimum). In the second stage, firms choose competitively (Nash) their home and export quant...

Who controls the controller? A dynamical model of corruption

The aim of this article is to give at least a partial answer to the question made in the title. Several works analyze the evolution of the corruption in different societies. Most of such papers show the necessity of several controls displayed by a central authority to deter the expansion of the corruption. However there is not much literature that addresses the issue of who controls the controller. This article...

A bifurcation theorem for evolutionary matrix models with multiple traits

One fundamental question in biology is population extinction and persistence, i.e., stability/instability of the extinction equilibrium and of non-extinction equilibria. In the case of nonlinear matrix models for structured populations, a bifurcation theorem answers this question when the projection matrix is primitive by showing the existence of a continuum of positive equilibria that bifurcates from the extin...

Optimal life-insurance selection and purchase within a market of several life-i...

We consider the problem faced by a wage-earner with an uncertain lifetime having to reach decisions concerning consumption and life-insurance purchase, while investing his savings in a financial market comprised of one risk-free security and an arbitrary number of risky securities whose prices are determined by diffusive linear stochastic differential equations. We assume that life-insurance is continuously ava...

Anosov Diffeomorphisms and -Tilings

We consider a toral Anosov automorphism G(gamma) : T-gamma --> T-gamma given by G(gamma) (x, y) = (ax + y, x) in the < v, w > base, where , a is an element of N\{1}, gamma = 1/(a + 1/(a + 1/...)), v = (gamma, 1) and w = (-1, gamma) in the canonical base of R-2 and T-gamma = R-2 / (vZ x wZ). We introduce the notion of gamma-tilings to prove the existence of a one-to-one correspondence between (i) marked smooth c...

Social Contracts, Free Riders and Utilities

EXPLOSION OF DIFFERENTIABILITY FOR EQUIVALENCIES BETWEEN ANOSOV FLOWS ON 3-MANI...

For Anosov flows obtained by suspensions of Anosov diffeomorphisms on surfaces, we show the following type of rigidity result: if a topological conjugacy between them is differentiable at a point, then the conjugacy has a smooth extension to the suspended 3-manifold. This result generalizes the similar ones of Sullivan and Ferreira-Pinto for 1-dimensional expanding dynamics and also a result of Ferreira-Pinto f...

LOCAL MARKET STRUCTURE IN A HOTELLING TOWN

We develop a theoretical framework to study the location-price competition in a Hotelling-type network game, extending the Hotelling model, with linear transportation costs, from a line (city) to a network (town). We show the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium price if, and only if, some explicit conditions on the production costs and on the network structure hold. Furthermore, we prove that the local optimal...

Localization and prices in the quadratic Hotelling model with uncertainty