2 documents found, page 1 of 1
Revenue implications of choosing discrete bid levels in a Japanese-English auction
Gonçalves, Ricardo; Ray, IndrajitWe consider the set-up of a Japanese-English auction with exogenously fixed discrete bid levels for a specific game (the wallet game with two bidders, following Goncalves and Ray in Econ Lett 159:177-179, 2017). We show that in this auction, partition equilibria exist that may be separating or pooling. We illustrate separating and pooling equilibria in games with two and three discrete bid levels and compare th...
A note on the wallet game with discrete bid levels
Gonçalves, Ricardo; Ray, IndrajitIt is well-known that in the wallet game with two bidders, bidding twice the (individual) signal is an equilibrium. We prove that this strategy is never an equilibrium in a Japanese–English auction once discrete bid levels are introduced; we also discuss the implications of this result.