10 documents found, page 1 of 1
Dumping in a Cournot Model
Nilanjan Banik; Fernanda A. Ferreira; J. Martins; Alberto A. PintoWe consider an international trade economical model where two firms of different countries compete in quantities and can use three different strategies: (i) repeated collusion, (ii) deviation from the foreigner firm followed by punishment by the home country and then followed by repeated Cournot, or (iii) repeated deviation followed by punishment. In some cases (ii) and (iii) can be interpreted as dumping.We co...
Uncertainty on a Bertrand Duopoly with Product Differentiation
Fernanda A. Ferreira; Alberto A. PintoThe conclusions of the Bertrand model of competition are substantially altered by the presence of either differentiated goods or asymmetric information about rival's production costs. In this paper, we consider a Bertrand competition, with differentiated goods. Furthermore, we suppose that each firm has two different technologies, and uses one of them according to a certain probability distribution. The use of ...
Price-Setting Dynamical Duopoly with Incomplete Information
Fernanda A. Ferreira; Flávio Ferreira; Alberto A. PintoWe consider a price competition in a duopoly with substitutable goods, linear and symmetric demand. There is a firm (F-1) that chooses first the price p(1) of its good; the other firm (F-2) observes p(1) and then chooses the price p(2) of its good. The conclusions of this price-setting dynamical duopoly are substantially altered by the presence of either differentiated goods or asymmetric information about riva...
Stochasticity Favoring the Effects of the R&D Strategies of the Firms
Alberto A. Pinto; Bruno M. P. M. Oliveira; Fernanda A. Ferreira; Flávio FerreiraWe present stochastic dynamics on the production costs of Cournot competitions, based on perfect Nash equilibria of nonlinear R&D investment strategies to reduce the production costs of the firms at every period of the game. We analyse the effects that the R&D investment strategies can have in the profits of the firms along the time. We observe that, in certain cases, the uncertainty can improve the effects of ...
Quantity Competition in a Differentiated Duopoly
Fernanda A. Ferreira; Flávio Ferreira; Miguel Ferreira; Alberto A. PintoIn this paper, we consider a Stackelberg duopoly competition with differentiated goods, linear and symmetric demand and with unknown costs. In our model, the two firms play a non-cooperative game with two stages: in a first stage, firm F 1 chooses the quantity, q 1, that is going to produce; in the second stage, firm F 2 observes the quantity q 1 produced by firm F 1 and chooses its own quantity q 2. Firms choo...
Investing to Survive in a Duopoly Model
Alberto A. Pinto; Bruno M. P. M. Oliveira; Fernanda A. Ferreira; Miguel FerreiraWe present deterministic dynamics on the production costs of Cournot competitions, based on perfect Nash equilibria of nonlinear R&D investment strategies to reduce the production costs of the firms at every period of the game. We analyse the effects that the R&D investment strategies can have in the profits of the firms along the time. We show that small changes in the initial production costs or small changes...
Bertrand model under incomplete information
Fernanda A. Ferreira; Alberto A. PintoWe consider a Bertrand duopoly model with unknown costs. The firms' aim is to choose the price of its product according to the well-known concept of Bayesian Nash equilibrium. The chooses are made simultaneously by both firms.In this paper, we suppose that each firm has two different technologies, and uses one of them according to a certain probability distribution. The use of either one or the other technology...
Bayesian price leadership
Fernanda A. Ferreira; Flávio Ferreira; Alberto A. PintoIn this paper, we consider a linear price setting duopoly competition with differentiated goods and with unknown costs. The firms' aims are to choose the prices of their products according to the well-known concept of perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium. There is a firm (F 1) that chooses first the price p 1 of its good; the other firm (F 2) observes p 1 and then chooses the price p 2 of its good. We suppose that...
Unknown costs in a duopoly with differentiated products
Fernanda A. Ferreira; Flávio Ferreira; Alberto A. PintoWe consider a duopoly model with unknown costs. The firms' aims are to maximize their profits by choosing the levels of their outputs. The chooses are made simultaneously by both firms. In this paper, we suppose that each firm has two different technologies, and uses one of them following a probability distribution. The utilization of one or the other technology affects the unitary production cost. We show that...
Asymmetric dynamic price competition with uncertainty
Fernanda A. Ferreira; Alberto A. PintoWe consider a dynamic setting-price duopoly model in which a dominant (leader) firm moves first and a subordinate (follower)firm moves second. We suppose that each firm has two different technologies, and uses one of them according to a certainprobability distribution. The use of either one or the other technology affects the unitary production cost. We analyse the effect of the production costs uncertainty on ...