We consider a price competition in a duopoly with substitutable goods, linear and symmetric demand. There is a firm (F-1) that chooses first the price p(1) of its good; the other firm (F-2) observes p(1) and then chooses the price p(2) of its good. The conclusions of this price-setting dynamical duopoly are substantially altered by the presence of either differentiated goods or asymmetric information about riva...
We present stochastic dynamics on the production costs of Cournot competitions, based on perfect Nash equilibria of nonlinear R&D investment strategies to reduce the production costs of the firms at every period of the game. We analyse the effects that the R&D investment strategies can have in the profits of the firms along the time. We observe that, in certain cases, the uncertainty can improve the effects of ...
In this paper, we consider a Stackelberg duopoly competition with differentiated goods, linear and symmetric demand and with unknown costs. In our model, the two firms play a non-cooperative game with two stages: in a first stage, firm F 1 chooses the quantity, q 1, that is going to produce; in the second stage, firm F 2 observes the quantity q 1 produced by firm F 1 and chooses its own quantity q 2. Firms choo...
There is a one-to-one correspondence between C^{1+H} Cantor exchange systems that are C^{1+H} fixed points of renormalization and C^{1+H} diffeomorphisms f on surfaces with a codimension 1 hyperbolic attractor Λ that admit an invariant measure absolutely continuous with respect to the Hausdorff measure on Λ. However, there is no such C^{1+α} Cantor exchange system with bounded geometry that is a C^{1+α} fixed p...
In this paper, we consider a linear price setting duopoly competition with differentiated goods and with unknown costs. The firms' aims are to choose the prices of their products according to the well-known concept of perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium. There is a firm (F 1) that chooses first the price p 1 of its good; the other firm (F 2) observes p 1 and then chooses the price p 2 of its good. We suppose that...
We consider a duopoly model with unknown costs. The firms' aims are to maximize their profits by choosing the levels of their outputs. The chooses are made simultaneously by both firms. In this paper, we suppose that each firm has two different technologies, and uses one of them following a probability distribution. The utilization of one or the other technology affects the unitary production cost. We show that...