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As part of a larger and more ambitious inquiry about the possibility of reinterpretating Wittgenstein’s concep-tion of the willing subject’from Epictetus’complex notion of prohairesis’, this paper aims to proceed to a preliminary analysis of moral person’and human dignity’as these terms are given by some of the Discourses remarks. In addition to a reading of Epictetus himself, we will also make use of Dragona-Monachou’s parallel drawn between the Stoic philosopher and Wittgenstein and of Stephens’and Long’s exegetical notes concerning the plural and intricate meaning of prohairesis’. For Epictetus, if everyone is nothing but its own prohairesis, what does it mean to say that everyone is nothing but its own rational decision or attitude “ or, to use Wittgenstein’s words, its own human dignity? The purpose of this paper is to look for some clues which would then allow us to answer this question.

As part of a larger and more ambitious inquiry about the possibility of reinterpretating Wittgenstein’s concep-tion of the willing subject’from Epictetus’complex notion of prohairesis’, this paper aims to proceed to a preliminary analysis of moral person’and human dignity’as these terms are given by some of the Discourses remarks. In addition to a reading of Epictetus himself, we will also make use of Dragona-Monachou’s parallel drawn between the Stoic philosopher and Wittgenstein and of Stephens’and Long’s exegetical notes concerning the plural and intricate meaning of prohairesis’. For Epictetus, if everyone is nothing but its own prohairesis, what does it mean to say that everyone is nothing but its own rational decision or attitude “ or, to use Wittgenstein’s words, its own human dignity? The purpose of this paper is to look for some clues which would then allow us to answer this question.

As part of a larger and more ambitious inquiry about the possibility of reinterpretating Wittgenstein’s concep-tion of the willing subject’from Epictetus’complex notion of prohairesis’, this paper aims to proceed to a preliminary analysis of moral person’and human dignity’as these terms are given by some of the Discourses remarks. In addition to a reading of Epictetus himself, we will also make use of Dragona-Monachou’s parallel drawn between the Stoic philosopher and Wittgenstein and of Stephens’and Long’s exegetical notes concerning the plural and intricate meaning of prohairesis’. For Epictetus, if everyone is nothing but its own prohairesis, what does it mean to say that everyone is nothing but its own rational decision or attitude “ or, to use Wittgenstein’s words, its own human dignity? The purpose of this paper is to look for some clues which would then allow us to answer this question.

As part of a larger and more ambitious inquiry about the possibility of reinterpretating Wittgenstein’s concep-tion of the willing subject’from Epictetus’complex notion of prohairesis’, this paper aims to proceed to a preliminary analysis of moral person’and human dignity’as these terms are given by some of the Discourses remarks. In addition to a reading of Epictetus himself, we will also make use of Dragona-Monachou’s parallel drawn between the Stoic philosopher and Wittgenstein and of Stephens’and Long’s exegetical notes concerning the plural and intricate meaning of prohairesis’. For Epictetus, if everyone is nothing but its own prohairesis, what does it mean to say that everyone is nothing but its own rational decision or attitude “ or, to use Wittgenstein’s words, its own human dignity? The purpose of this paper is to look for some clues which would then allow us to answer this question.

As part of a larger and more ambitious inquiry about the possibility of reinterpretating Wittgenstein’s concep-tion of the willing subject’from Epictetus’complex notion of prohairesis’, this paper aims to proceed to a preliminary analysis of moral person’and human dignity’as these terms are given by some of the Discourses remarks. In addition to a reading of Epictetus himself, we will also make use of Dragona-Monachou’s parallel drawn between the Stoic philosopher and Wittgenstein and of Stephens’and Long’s exegetical notes concerning the plural and intricate meaning of prohairesis’. For Epictetus, if everyone is nothing but its own prohairesis, what does it mean to say that everyone is nothing but its own rational decision or attitude “ or, to use Wittgenstein’s words, its own human dignity? The purpose of this paper is to look for some clues which would then allow us to answer this question.

Fazendo parte de uma pesquisa mais abrangente e mais ambiciosa sobre a possibilidade de uma releitura do conceito wittgensteiniano de sujeito da vontade’a partir do complexo conceito de prohairesis’em Epiteto, o presente trabalho visa proceder a uma análise preliminar de pessoa moral’e de dig-nidade humana’tal como dados por algumas das observações dos Discursos. Para além de uma leitura do próprio Epiteto, nos serviremos igualmente dos paralelos traçados por Dragona--Monachou entre o filósofo estoico e Wittgenstein e das notas exegéticas de Stephens e Long relativamente à significação plural de prohairesis’. Se para Epiteto cada um é tão somente a sua prohairesis, o que significa dizer que cada um é tão somente a sua própria decisão racional ou atitude “ ou, em termos de Wittgenstein, a sua dignidade humana? A intenção deste texto é procurar por possíveis pistas que nos permitam responder a esta pergunta.

As part of a larger and more ambitious inquiry about the possibility of reinterpretating Wittgenstein’s concep-tion of the willing subject’from Epictetus’complex notion of prohairesis’, this paper aims to proceed to a preliminary analysis of moral person’and human dignity’as these terms are given by some of the Discourses remarks. In addition to a reading of Epictetus himself, we will also make use of Dragona-Monachou’s parallel drawn between the Stoic philosopher and Wittgenstein and of Stephens’and Long’s exegetical notes concerning the plural and intricate meaning of prohairesis’. For Epictetus, if everyone is nothing but its own prohairesis, what does it mean to say that everyone is nothing but its own rational decision or attitude “ or, to use Wittgenstein’s words, its own human dignity? The purpose of this paper is to look for some clues which would then allow us to answer this question.