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Optimal subsidies and guarantees in public–private partnerships

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Resumo:In this paper, we analyse how certain subsidies and guarantees given to private firms in public–private partnerships should be optimally arranged to promote immediate investment in a real options framework. We show how an investment subsidy, a revenue subsidy, a minimum demand guarantee, and a rescue option could be optimally arranged to induce immediate investment, compensating for the value of the option to defer. These four types of incentives produce significantly different results when we compare the value of the project after the incentive structure is devised and also when we compare the timing of the resulting cash flows.
Autores principais:Armada, Manuel José da Rocha
Outros Autores:Pereira, Paulo J.; Rodrigues, Artur
Assunto:Option to defer Public-private partnerships Early exercise Incentives
Ano:2012
País:Portugal
Tipo de documento:artigo
Tipo de acesso:acesso restrito
Instituição associada:Universidade do Minho
Idioma:inglês
Origem:RepositóriUM - Universidade do Minho
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author Armada, Manuel José da Rocha
author2 Pereira, Paulo J.
Rodrigues, Artur
author2_role author
author
author_facet Armada, Manuel José da Rocha
Pereira, Paulo J.
Rodrigues, Artur
author_role author
contributor_name_str_mv RepositóriUM - Universidade do Minho
country_str PT
creators_json_txt [{\"Person.name\":\"Armada, Manuel José da Rocha\"},{\"Person.name\":\"Pereira, Paulo J.\"},{\"Person.name\":\"Rodrigues, Artur\"}]
datacite.contributors.contributor.contributorName.fl_str_mv RepositóriUM - Universidade do Minho
datacite.creators.creator.creatorName.fl_str_mv Armada, Manuel José da Rocha
Pereira, Paulo J.
Rodrigues, Artur
datacite.date.Accepted.fl_str_mv 2012-01-01T00:00:00Z
datacite.date.available.fl_str_mv 2012-12-10T15:12:43Z
datacite.date.embargoed.fl_str_mv 2012-12-10T15:12:43Z
datacite.rights.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec
datacite.subjects.subject.fl_str_mv Option to defer
Public-private partnerships
Early exercise
Incentives
datacite.titles.title.fl_str_mv Optimal subsidies and guarantees in public–private partnerships
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv RepositóriUM - Universidade do Minho
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Armada, Manuel José da Rocha
Pereira, Paulo J.
Rodrigues, Artur
dc.date.Accepted.fl_str_mv 2012-01-01T00:00:00Z
dc.date.available.fl_str_mv 2012-12-10T15:12:43Z
dc.date.embargoed.fl_str_mv 2012-12-10T15:12:43Z
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv https://hdl.handle.net/1822/21359
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Taylor and Francis
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Option to defer
Public-private partnerships
Early exercise
Incentives
dc.title.fl_str_mv Optimal subsidies and guarantees in public–private partnerships
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
description In this paper, we analyse how certain subsidies and guarantees given to private firms in public–private partnerships should be optimally arranged to promote immediate investment in a real options framework. We show how an investment subsidy, a revenue subsidy, a minimum demand guarantee, and a rescue option could be optimally arranged to induce immediate investment, compensating for the value of the option to defer. These four types of incentives produce significantly different results when we compare the value of the project after the incentive structure is devised and also when we compare the timing of the resulting cash flows.
dirty 0
eu_rights_str_mv restrictedAccess
format article
fulltext.url.fl_str_mv https://repositorium.uminho.pt/bitstreams/3c34ae14-1e3f-4f75-ae16-ef9372133096/download
id rum_6358c04afedf30ea1df44f07f5dc17df
identifier.url.fl_str_mv https://hdl.handle.net/1822/21359
instacron_str repositorium
institution Universidade do Minho
instname_str Universidade do Minho
language eng
network_acronym_str rum
network_name_str RepositóriUM - Universidade do Minho
oai_identifier_str oai:repositorium.uminho.pt:1822/21359
organization_str_mv urn:organizationAcronym:repositorium
person_str_mv Armada, Manuel José da Rocha
Pereira, Paulo J.
Rodrigues, Artur
publishDate 2012
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Taylor and Francis
reponame_str RepositóriUM - Universidade do Minho
repository_id_str urn:repositoryAcronym:rum
service_str_mv urn:repositoryAcronym:rum
spelling engTaylor and FrancisporIn this paper, we analyse how certain subsidies and guarantees given to private firms in public–private partnerships should be optimally arranged to promote immediate investment in a real options framework. We show how an investment subsidy, a revenue subsidy, a minimum demand guarantee, and a rescue option could be optimally arranged to induce immediate investment, compensating for the value of the option to defer. These four types of incentives produce significantly different results when we compare the value of the project after the incentive structure is devised and also when we compare the timing of the resulting cash flows.application/pdfporOptimal subsidies and guarantees in public–private partnershipsArmada, Manuel José da RochaPereira, Paulo J.Rodrigues, ArturHostingInstitutionOrganizationalRepositóriUM - Universidade do Minhoe-mailmailto:repositorium@usdb.uminho.ptrepositorium@usdb.uminho.ptISSNIsPartOf1351-847XDOIIsPartOf10.1080/1351847X.2011.6397892012-12-10T15:12:43Z20122012-01-01T00:00:00ZHandlehttps://hdl.handle.net/1822/21359http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ecrestricted accessOption to deferPublic-private partnershipsEarly exerciseIncentives816383 bytesliteraturehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501journal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ecapplication/pdffulltexthttps://repositorium.uminho.pt/bitstreams/3c34ae14-1e3f-4f75-ae16-ef9372133096/download
spellingShingle Optimal subsidies and guarantees in public–private partnerships
Armada, Manuel José da Rocha
Option to defer
Public-private partnerships
Early exercise
Incentives
status SINGLETON
subject.fl_str_mv Option to defer
Public-private partnerships
Early exercise
Incentives
title Optimal subsidies and guarantees in public–private partnerships
title_full Optimal subsidies and guarantees in public–private partnerships
title_fullStr Optimal subsidies and guarantees in public–private partnerships
title_full_unstemmed Optimal subsidies and guarantees in public–private partnerships
title_short Optimal subsidies and guarantees in public–private partnerships
title_sort Optimal subsidies and guarantees in public–private partnerships
topic Option to defer
Public-private partnerships
Early exercise
Incentives
topic_facet Option to defer
Public-private partnerships
Early exercise
Incentives
url https://hdl.handle.net/1822/21359
visible 1