Autor(es): Aguiar-Conraria, Luis ; Fernandes, Bruno ; Magalhães, Pedro C.
Data: 2023
Identificador Persistente: http://hdl.handle.net/10451/61421
Origem: Repositório da Universidade de Lisboa
Autor(es): Aguiar-Conraria, Luis ; Fernandes, Bruno ; Magalhães, Pedro C.
Data: 2023
Identificador Persistente: http://hdl.handle.net/10451/61421
Origem: Repositório da Universidade de Lisboa
Over the last two decades, several studies have enhanced our understanding of the relationship between the economy and public support for the executive in Portugal (Veiga, 1998; Veiga and Veiga, 2004a; 2007). The central finding is clear: the public approval of governments and prime ministers is affected by economic performance. This is not at all surprising. Left-right socio-economic issues have dominated the policy agenda throughout Portugal’s democratic history (Tsatsanis, Freire, and Tsirbas, 2014, 527). Despite a proportional representation electoral system, party-system fragmentation in Portugal has remained relatively low and was, until recently, declining, a singular trend among established democracies (Lijphart, 2012, 75). Since 1985, cabinets have either been single-party governments (often with an absolute majority) or minimum-winning ideologically cohesive coalitions. The combination of persistently high salience of economic issues and high clarity of responsibility for outcomes makes Portugal a clear-cut candidate for a solid and stable linkage between economic performance and the executive’s public approval.