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Municipal service delivery: the role of transaction costs in the choice between alternative governance mechanisms

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Resumo:Currently, due to their level of proximity and periodic transfers of competences from the national government, local governments are responsible for many services consumed by citizens. Their competences are growing and nowadays include water supply, promotion of regional development, solid waste collection, emergency management, health care, education, land use management, among many others. To cope with all these challenges, local governments changed from a single multi-purpose organization to a complex network of relationships with other public bodies, private agents, and non-profit organizations. In this complex network we witness different levels and combinations of autonomy and control that local governments allow/impose on their agencies/partners/contractors. Local governments in Portugal no longer assume the provision of all public services through in-house bureaucracies. They combine different strategies of coordination using both market competition and network collaboration based on trust as alternative mechanisms. The path of evolution began with simple hierarchic organizations composed by municipal services, then it moved to municipalized services (a slightly more autonomous and flexible configuration) followed by enabling legislation allowing local governments to create municipal corporations (Tavares & Camões, 2007), which in many cases replaced former arrangements. By the end of the 1990s, local governments began contracting with external actors to provide public services. Their option was to contract-out public services making use of market price mechanisms and market competitiveness. In other cases, local governments preferred less competitive partnerships with other governments or with non-profit organizations (mostly on social services). A survey conducted among local governments allows us to identify twelve organizational configuration alternatives to deliver public services: municipal services; municipalized services; municipal enterprises; inter-municipal enterprises; municipal commercial corporations; public commercial corporations; mixed commercial corporations; contracting-out of private agents; partnerships with non-profit actors; local governments associations; and metropolitan associations. Using coordination and control mechanisms as a criteria (authority, competition and collaboration), we seek to identify all the alternatives presented in three governance mechanisms (hierarchy, market, and networks). 2 Municipal Service Delivery: The Role of Transaction Costs in the Choicebetween Alternative Governance Mechanisms. EGPA Annual Conference, Malta, 2-5 September 2009 Next, we employ a transaction cost framework to derive a set of hypotheses explaining the choice of governance mechanisms to provide public services. In order to do so, we develop four sets of independent variables concerning service characteristics, community characteristics, financial situation, and administrative and political stability. Services with high levels of specificity and difficult measurability involve high levels of transactions costs, making them less likely to be externalized (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975; Nelson, 1997; Ferris & Graddy, 1997). Second, we argue that local governments operating in highly complex environments require more flexible governance solutions (Burns & Stalker, 1961) and, in contrast, mechanisms of governance based on hierarchy are more likely to be adopted in environments characterized by lower levels of complexity in service provision (Weber, 1947; Alexander, 1995; Blau & Meyer, 1971). Third, we argue that different degrees of financial capacity drive local governments to choose different mechanisms of governance (Brown, Potoski, & Slyke, 2006). Finally, based upon work by Hood (1998), Frant (1996), and Clingermayer and Feiock (1997), we suggest that political instability can put pressure on politicians to improve efficiency levels through the use of external agents. We test our hypotheses with a multinomial logit regression model using survey data collected from 101 Portuguese local governments and archival data available from the National Bureau of Statistics.
Autores principais:Rodrigues, Miguel
Outros Autores:Araújo, Filipe; Tavares, António F.
Assunto:Governance mechanisms Local government Service delivery Transactions cost
Ano:2009
País:Portugal
Tipo de documento:artigo
Tipo de acesso:acesso aberto
Instituição associada:Instituto Politécnico de Bragança
Idioma:inglês
Origem:Biblioteca Digital do IPB
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author Rodrigues, Miguel
author2 Araújo, Filipe
Tavares, António F.
author2_role author
author
author_facet Rodrigues, Miguel
Araújo, Filipe
Tavares, António F.
author_role author
contributor_name_str_mv Biblioteca Digital do IPB
country_str PT
creators_json_txt [{\"Person.name\":\"Rodrigues, Miguel\",\"Person.identifier.orcid\":\"0000-0002-2254-2607\"},{\"Person.name\":\"Araújo, Filipe\"},{\"Person.name\":\"Tavares, António F.\"}]
datacite.contributors.contributor.contributorName.fl_str_mv Biblioteca Digital do IPB
datacite.creators.creator.creatorName.fl_str_mv Rodrigues, Miguel
Araújo, Filipe
Tavares, António F.
datacite.date.Accepted.fl_str_mv 2009-01-01T00:00:00Z
datacite.date.available.fl_str_mv 2010-01-25T16:33:59Z
datacite.date.embargoed.fl_str_mv 2010-01-25T16:33:59Z
datacite.rights.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
datacite.subjects.subject.fl_str_mv Governance mechanisms
Local government
Service delivery
Transactions cost
datacite.titles.title.fl_str_mv Municipal service delivery: the role of transaction costs in the choice between alternative governance mechanisms
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv Biblioteca Digital do IPB
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Rodrigues, Miguel
Araújo, Filipe
Tavares, António F.
dc.date.Accepted.fl_str_mv 2009-01-01T00:00:00Z
dc.date.available.fl_str_mv 2010-01-25T16:33:59Z
dc.date.embargoed.fl_str_mv 2010-01-25T16:33:59Z
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10198/1462
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Governance mechanisms
Local government
Service delivery
Transactions cost
dc.title.fl_str_mv Municipal service delivery: the role of transaction costs in the choice between alternative governance mechanisms
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
description Currently, due to their level of proximity and periodic transfers of competences from the national government, local governments are responsible for many services consumed by citizens. Their competences are growing and nowadays include water supply, promotion of regional development, solid waste collection, emergency management, health care, education, land use management, among many others. To cope with all these challenges, local governments changed from a single multi-purpose organization to a complex network of relationships with other public bodies, private agents, and non-profit organizations. In this complex network we witness different levels and combinations of autonomy and control that local governments allow/impose on their agencies/partners/contractors. Local governments in Portugal no longer assume the provision of all public services through in-house bureaucracies. They combine different strategies of coordination using both market competition and network collaboration based on trust as alternative mechanisms. The path of evolution began with simple hierarchic organizations composed by municipal services, then it moved to municipalized services (a slightly more autonomous and flexible configuration) followed by enabling legislation allowing local governments to create municipal corporations (Tavares & Camões, 2007), which in many cases replaced former arrangements. By the end of the 1990s, local governments began contracting with external actors to provide public services. Their option was to contract-out public services making use of market price mechanisms and market competitiveness. In other cases, local governments preferred less competitive partnerships with other governments or with non-profit organizations (mostly on social services). A survey conducted among local governments allows us to identify twelve organizational configuration alternatives to deliver public services: municipal services; municipalized services; municipal enterprises; inter-municipal enterprises; municipal commercial corporations; public commercial corporations; mixed commercial corporations; contracting-out of private agents; partnerships with non-profit actors; local governments associations; and metropolitan associations. Using coordination and control mechanisms as a criteria (authority, competition and collaboration), we seek to identify all the alternatives presented in three governance mechanisms (hierarchy, market, and networks). 2 Municipal Service Delivery: The Role of Transaction Costs in the Choicebetween Alternative Governance Mechanisms. EGPA Annual Conference, Malta, 2-5 September 2009 Next, we employ a transaction cost framework to derive a set of hypotheses explaining the choice of governance mechanisms to provide public services. In order to do so, we develop four sets of independent variables concerning service characteristics, community characteristics, financial situation, and administrative and political stability. Services with high levels of specificity and difficult measurability involve high levels of transactions costs, making them less likely to be externalized (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975; Nelson, 1997; Ferris & Graddy, 1997). Second, we argue that local governments operating in highly complex environments require more flexible governance solutions (Burns & Stalker, 1961) and, in contrast, mechanisms of governance based on hierarchy are more likely to be adopted in environments characterized by lower levels of complexity in service provision (Weber, 1947; Alexander, 1995; Blau & Meyer, 1971). Third, we argue that different degrees of financial capacity drive local governments to choose different mechanisms of governance (Brown, Potoski, & Slyke, 2006). Finally, based upon work by Hood (1998), Frant (1996), and Clingermayer and Feiock (1997), we suggest that political instability can put pressure on politicians to improve efficiency levels through the use of external agents. We test our hypotheses with a multinomial logit regression model using survey data collected from 101 Portuguese local governments and archival data available from the National Bureau of Statistics.
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Rodrigues, Miguel
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Araújo, Filipe
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spelling engptCurrently, due to their level of proximity and periodic transfers of competences from the national government, local governments are responsible for many services consumed by citizens. Their competences are growing and nowadays include water supply, promotion of regional development, solid waste collection, emergency management, health care, education, land use management, among many others. To cope with all these challenges, local governments changed from a single multi-purpose organization to a complex network of relationships with other public bodies, private agents, and non-profit organizations. In this complex network we witness different levels and combinations of autonomy and control that local governments allow/impose on their agencies/partners/contractors. Local governments in Portugal no longer assume the provision of all public services through in-house bureaucracies. They combine different strategies of coordination using both market competition and network collaboration based on trust as alternative mechanisms. The path of evolution began with simple hierarchic organizations composed by municipal services, then it moved to municipalized services (a slightly more autonomous and flexible configuration) followed by enabling legislation allowing local governments to create municipal corporations (Tavares & Camões, 2007), which in many cases replaced former arrangements. By the end of the 1990s, local governments began contracting with external actors to provide public services. Their option was to contract-out public services making use of market price mechanisms and market competitiveness. In other cases, local governments preferred less competitive partnerships with other governments or with non-profit organizations (mostly on social services). A survey conducted among local governments allows us to identify twelve organizational configuration alternatives to deliver public services: municipal services; municipalized services; municipal enterprises; inter-municipal enterprises; municipal commercial corporations; public commercial corporations; mixed commercial corporations; contracting-out of private agents; partnerships with non-profit actors; local governments associations; and metropolitan associations. Using coordination and control mechanisms as a criteria (authority, competition and collaboration), we seek to identify all the alternatives presented in three governance mechanisms (hierarchy, market, and networks). 2 Municipal Service Delivery: The Role of Transaction Costs in the Choicebetween Alternative Governance Mechanisms. EGPA Annual Conference, Malta, 2-5 September 2009 Next, we employ a transaction cost framework to derive a set of hypotheses explaining the choice of governance mechanisms to provide public services. In order to do so, we develop four sets of independent variables concerning service characteristics, community characteristics, financial situation, and administrative and political stability. Services with high levels of specificity and difficult measurability involve high levels of transactions costs, making them less likely to be externalized (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975; Nelson, 1997; Ferris & Graddy, 1997). Second, we argue that local governments operating in highly complex environments require more flexible governance solutions (Burns & Stalker, 1961) and, in contrast, mechanisms of governance based on hierarchy are more likely to be adopted in environments characterized by lower levels of complexity in service provision (Weber, 1947; Alexander, 1995; Blau & Meyer, 1971). Third, we argue that different degrees of financial capacity drive local governments to choose different mechanisms of governance (Brown, Potoski, & Slyke, 2006). Finally, based upon work by Hood (1998), Frant (1996), and Clingermayer and Feiock (1997), we suggest that political instability can put pressure on politicians to improve efficiency levels through the use of external agents. We test our hypotheses with a multinomial logit regression model using survey data collected from 101 Portuguese local governments and archival data available from the National Bureau of Statistics.application/pdfptMunicipal service delivery: the role of transaction costs in the choice between alternative governance mechanismsPersonalRodrigues, MiguelDSpacehttp://dspace.org/items/637c1bda-1dc2-4532-b977-833f47e4d245DSpacehttp://dspace.org/items/637c1bda-1dc2-4532-b977-833f47e4d245RodriguesMiguelCiência IDhttps://www.ciencia-id.ptF71E-C528-C082ORCIDhttp://orcid.org0000-0002-2254-2607Researcher IDhttps://www.researcherid.comF-2950-2018Scopus Author IDhttps://www.scopus.com55932145600Araújo, FilipeTavares, António F.HostingInstitutionOrganizationalBiblioteca Digital do IPBe-mailmailto:dspace@ipb.ptdspace@ipb.ptDOIIsPartOf10.1080/03003930.2012.6662112010-01-25T16:33:59Z20092009-01-01T00:00:00ZHandlehttp://hdl.handle.net/10198/1462http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2open accessGovernance mechanismsLocal governmentService deliveryTransactions cost193720 bytesliteraturehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501journal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2application/pdffulltexthttps://bibliotecadigital.ipb.pt/bitstreams/82e91be7-2708-450d-8ac0-7365f0f4b03f/download
spellingShingle Municipal service delivery: the role of transaction costs in the choice between alternative governance mechanisms
Rodrigues, Miguel
Governance mechanisms
Local government
Service delivery
Transactions cost
status SINGLETON
subject.fl_str_mv Governance mechanisms
Local government
Service delivery
Transactions cost
title Municipal service delivery: the role of transaction costs in the choice between alternative governance mechanisms
title_full Municipal service delivery: the role of transaction costs in the choice between alternative governance mechanisms
title_fullStr Municipal service delivery: the role of transaction costs in the choice between alternative governance mechanisms
title_full_unstemmed Municipal service delivery: the role of transaction costs in the choice between alternative governance mechanisms
title_short Municipal service delivery: the role of transaction costs in the choice between alternative governance mechanisms
title_sort Municipal service delivery: the role of transaction costs in the choice between alternative governance mechanisms
topic Governance mechanisms
Local government
Service delivery
Transactions cost
topic_facet Governance mechanisms
Local government
Service delivery
Transactions cost
url http://hdl.handle.net/10198/1462
visible 1