Publicação
An economic road to peace, a peaceful road for growth: regional integration through the side door in Western Europe and South America
| Resumo: | This article provides a historical comparison between initial integration strategies in Western Europe in the 1950s and South America in the 1980s. In both cases, regional leaders constrained by structural determinants were forced to make the first move towards regionalization outside of their primary area of interest. That is, Europeans seeking pacification and the establishment of a “United Europe” negotiated a common market for French and German coal and steel industries, whereas South Americans, trying to alleviate their debt-ridden economies, negotiated as the first regional agreement of the democratic period Argentine-Brazilian nuclear cooperation. Why if the primary regional goal for the Europeans was sustained peace did they agree on a commercial pact? By the same token, why did Argentines and Brazilians negotiate nuclear integration, when the economic problems of the two countries were so urgent? This article answers these questions by placing the key players of the two regions in their historical context, showing that in both cases the dominant political strategy was “aim low to score high.” |
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| Autores principais: | Alcañiz, Isabella |
| Assunto: | Cooperação internacional Integração regional Energia nuclear União Europeia MERCOSUL |
| Ano: | 2005 |
| País: | Portugal |
| Tipo de documento: | working paper |
| Tipo de acesso: | acesso aberto |
| Instituição associada: | ISCTE |
| Idioma: | inglês |
| Origem: | Repositório ISCTE |
| Resumo: | This article provides a historical comparison between initial integration strategies in Western Europe in the 1950s and South America in the 1980s. In both cases, regional leaders constrained by structural determinants were forced to make the first move towards regionalization outside of their primary area of interest. That is, Europeans seeking pacification and the establishment of a “United Europe” negotiated a common market for French and German coal and steel industries, whereas South Americans, trying to alleviate their debt-ridden economies, negotiated as the first regional agreement of the democratic period Argentine-Brazilian nuclear cooperation. Why if the primary regional goal for the Europeans was sustained peace did they agree on a commercial pact? By the same token, why did Argentines and Brazilians negotiate nuclear integration, when the economic problems of the two countries were so urgent? This article answers these questions by placing the key players of the two regions in their historical context, showing that in both cases the dominant political strategy was “aim low to score high.” |
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