Publicação
The influence of remuneration structure on earnings management
| Resumo: | This study draws on agency theory, evaluates the effect of remuneration structures of board members on earnings management, proxied by discretionary accruals. To achieve the objective, this study uses a multiple regression model and a hand-collected dataset of Portuguese listed firms from 2015 to 2019. This study suggests that fixed board remuneration is associated with lower levels of earnings management, as opposed to variable remuneration of board members, which is strongly associated with a higher level of earnings management. The findings based on this study provide useful information to investors and regulators in evaluating the effect of board compensation structure on earnings management. Additionally, this study expands the corporate governance literature by examining an under researched mechanism to address the agency problem. |
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| Autores principais: | Paiva, I. |
| Outros Autores: | Carvalho, L. C.; Dias, C. |
| Assunto: | Agency theory Earnings management Portugal Remuneration |
| Ano: | 2023 |
| País: | Portugal |
| Tipo de documento: | documento de conferência |
| Tipo de acesso: | acesso aberto |
| Instituição associada: | ISCTE |
| Idioma: | inglês |
| Origem: | Repositório ISCTE |
| Resumo: | This study draws on agency theory, evaluates the effect of remuneration structures of board members on earnings management, proxied by discretionary accruals. To achieve the objective, this study uses a multiple regression model and a hand-collected dataset of Portuguese listed firms from 2015 to 2019. This study suggests that fixed board remuneration is associated with lower levels of earnings management, as opposed to variable remuneration of board members, which is strongly associated with a higher level of earnings management. The findings based on this study provide useful information to investors and regulators in evaluating the effect of board compensation structure on earnings management. Additionally, this study expands the corporate governance literature by examining an under researched mechanism to address the agency problem. |
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