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Oversight, Accountability, or Influence? Understanding the Use of Monetary Dialogues in the European Parliament

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Resumo:The Monetary Dialogue (MD) between the European Central Bank (ECB) and the European Parliament (EP) has received ample research that has offered an insightful discussion on the effectiveness of the dialogue as a forum for ECB accountability. However, most of the literature has focused on what the ECB is held accountable for or how the ECB engages in the dialogues. Key questions remain, however, regarding the goals and actions of the individual members of the European Parliament (MEPs) that this article seeks to address. First, we develop a theoretical framework that moves beyond a general concept of “accountability” and differentiates between accountability, oversight, and influence. By defining the concepts more precisely, our aim is to distinguish types of engagement and offer a comparative perspective to broaden the discussion of accountability forums. Second, our article contributes to a growing subset of literature on the MD that shifts the focus from what the ECB gets from the dialogues to how MEPs utilize the MD. To achieve this, we analyze and code MEP questions during the quarterly MD and investigate the impact that member state, national party, and EP political group affiliation have on the character of the questions asked by MEPs over time.
Autores principais:Kreppel, Amie
Outros Autores:Tomasi, Corinne
Assunto:accountability; European Central Bank; European Parliament; Monetary Dialogues; oversight
Ano:2025
País:Portugal
Tipo de documento:artigo
Tipo de acesso:unknown
Instituição associada:Cogitatio Press
Idioma:inglês
Origem:Politics and Governance
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author Kreppel, Amie
author2 Tomasi, Corinne
author2_role author
author_facet Kreppel, Amie
Tomasi, Corinne
author_role author
country_str PT
creators_json_txt [{\"Person.name\":\"Kreppel, Amie\"},{\"Person.name\":\"Tomasi, Corinne\"}]
datacite.creators.creator.creatorName.fl_str_mv Kreppel, Amie
Tomasi, Corinne
datacite.rights.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
datacite.subjects.subject.fl_str_mv accountability; European Central Bank; European Parliament; Monetary Dialogues; oversight
datacite.titles.title.fl_str_mv Oversight, Accountability, or Influence? Understanding the Use of Monetary Dialogues in the European Parliament
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Kreppel, Amie
Tomasi, Corinne
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.8941
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Cogitatio Press
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
dc.rights.rights.copyright.fl_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Politics and Governance; Vol 13 (2025): Ditching the Maastricht Model? The Evolving Role of the European Central Bank in the Economic and Monetary Union
2183-2463
10.17645/pag.i386
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv accountability; European Central Bank; European Parliament; Monetary Dialogues; oversight
dc.title.fl_str_mv Oversight, Accountability, or Influence? Understanding the Use of Monetary Dialogues in the European Parliament
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
description The Monetary Dialogue (MD) between the European Central Bank (ECB) and the European Parliament (EP) has received ample research that has offered an insightful discussion on the effectiveness of the dialogue as a forum for ECB accountability. However, most of the literature has focused on what the ECB is held accountable for or how the ECB engages in the dialogues. Key questions remain, however, regarding the goals and actions of the individual members of the European Parliament (MEPs) that this article seeks to address. First, we develop a theoretical framework that moves beyond a general concept of “accountability” and differentiates between accountability, oversight, and influence. By defining the concepts more precisely, our aim is to distinguish types of engagement and offer a comparative perspective to broaden the discussion of accountability forums. Second, our article contributes to a growing subset of literature on the MD that shifts the focus from what the ECB gets from the dialogues to how MEPs utilize the MD. To achieve this, we analyze and code MEP questions during the quarterly MD and investigate the impact that member state, national party, and EP political group affiliation have on the character of the questions asked by MEPs over time.
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Tomasi, Corinne
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spelling en-USOversight, Accountability, or Influence? Understanding the Use of Monetary Dialogues in the European ParliamentKreppel, AmieTomasi, Corinneaccountability; European Central Bank; European Parliament; Monetary Dialogues; oversightCopyright (c) 2025 Amie Kreppel, Corinne Tomasihttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.8941DOIhttps://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/view/8941URLHasVersionhttps://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/view/8941/4199URLHasVersionhttps://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/downloadSuppFile/8941/4255URLHasVersionhttps://doi.org/10.17645/pag.8941DOI2025-01-30en-USThe Monetary Dialogue (MD) between the European Central Bank (ECB) and the European Parliament (EP) has received ample research that has offered an insightful discussion on the effectiveness of the dialogue as a forum for ECB accountability. However, most of the literature has focused on what the ECB is held accountable for or how the ECB engages in the dialogues. Key questions remain, however, regarding the goals and actions of the individual members of the European Parliament (MEPs) that this article seeks to address. First, we develop a theoretical framework that moves beyond a general concept of “accountability” and differentiates between accountability, oversight, and influence. By defining the concepts more precisely, our aim is to distinguish types of engagement and offer a comparative perspective to broaden the discussion of accountability forums. Second, our article contributes to a growing subset of literature on the MD that shifts the focus from what the ECB gets from the dialogues to how MEPs utilize the MD. To achieve this, we analyze and code MEP questions during the quarterly MD and investigate the impact that member state, national party, and EP political group affiliation have on the character of the questions asked by MEPs over time.Cogitatio Pressapplication/pdfen-USPolitics and Governance; Vol 13 (2025): Ditching the Maastricht Model? The Evolving Role of the European Central Bank in the Economic and Monetary Union2183-246310.17645/pag.i386engjournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501literatureVoRhttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
spellingShingle Oversight, Accountability, or Influence? Understanding the Use of Monetary Dialogues in the European Parliament
Kreppel, Amie
accountability; European Central Bank; European Parliament; Monetary Dialogues; oversight
status SINGLETON
status_str VoR
subject.fl_str_mv accountability; European Central Bank; European Parliament; Monetary Dialogues; oversight
title Oversight, Accountability, or Influence? Understanding the Use of Monetary Dialogues in the European Parliament
title_full Oversight, Accountability, or Influence? Understanding the Use of Monetary Dialogues in the European Parliament
title_fullStr Oversight, Accountability, or Influence? Understanding the Use of Monetary Dialogues in the European Parliament
title_full_unstemmed Oversight, Accountability, or Influence? Understanding the Use of Monetary Dialogues in the European Parliament
title_short Oversight, Accountability, or Influence? Understanding the Use of Monetary Dialogues in the European Parliament
title_sort Oversight, Accountability, or Influence? Understanding the Use of Monetary Dialogues in the European Parliament
topic accountability; European Central Bank; European Parliament; Monetary Dialogues; oversight
topic_facet accountability; European Central Bank; European Parliament; Monetary Dialogues; oversight
url https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.8941
visible 1