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Can Climate Change Negotiations Succeed?

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Resumo:More than two decades of climate change negotiations have produced a series of global climate agreements, such as the Kyoto Protocol and the Copenhagen Accords, but have nevertheless made very limited progress in curbing global emissions of greenhouse gases. This paper considers whether negotiations can succeed in reaching an agreement that effectively addresses the climate change problem. To be effective, a climate agreement must cause substantial emissions reductions either directly (in the agreement's own lifetime) or indirectly (by paving the way for a future agreement that causes substantial emissions reductions directly). To reduce global emissions substantially, an agreement must satisfy three conditions. Firstly, participation must be both comprehensive and stable. Secondly, participating countries must accept deep commitments. Finally, the agreement must obtain high compliance rates. We argue that three types of enforcement will be crucial to fulfilling these three conditions: (1) incentives for countries to ratify with deep commitments, (2) incentives for countries that have ratified with deep commitments to abstain from withdrawal, and (3) incentives for countries having ratified with deep commitments to comply with them. Based on assessing the constraints that characterize the climate change negotiations, we contend that adopting such three-fold potent enforcement will likely be politically infeasible, not only within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, but also in the framework of a more gradual approach. Therefore, one should not expect climate change negotiations to succeed in producing an effective future agreement—either directly or indirectly.
Autores principais:Hovi, Jon
Outros Autores:Skodvin, Tora; Aakre, Stine
Assunto:climate change negotiations; compliance; cooperation; enforcement; participation; political feasibility
Ano:2013
País:Portugal
Tipo de documento:artigo
Instituição associada:Cogitatio Press
Idioma:inglês
Origem:Politics and Governance
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author Hovi, Jon
author2 Skodvin, Tora
Aakre, Stine
author2_role author
author
author_facet Hovi, Jon
Skodvin, Tora
Aakre, Stine
author_role author
country_str PT
creators_json_str [{\"Person.name\":\"Hovi, Jon\"},{\"Person.name\":\"Skodvin, Tora\"},{\"Person.name\":\"Aakre, Stine\"}]
datacite.creators.creator.creatorName.fl_str_mv Hovi, Jon
Skodvin, Tora
Aakre, Stine
datacite.rights.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
datacite.subjects.subject.fl_str_mv climate change negotiations; compliance; cooperation; enforcement; participation; political feasibility
datacite.titles.title.fl_str_mv Can Climate Change Negotiations Succeed?
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Hovi, Jon
Skodvin, Tora
Aakre, Stine
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v1i2.96
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Cogitatio Press
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Politics and Governance; Vol 1, No 2 (2013): Multidisciplinary Studies in Politics and Governance; 138-150
2183-2463
10.17645/pag.i13
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv climate change negotiations; compliance; cooperation; enforcement; participation; political feasibility
dc.title.fl_str_mv Can Climate Change Negotiations Succeed?
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
description More than two decades of climate change negotiations have produced a series of global climate agreements, such as the Kyoto Protocol and the Copenhagen Accords, but have nevertheless made very limited progress in curbing global emissions of greenhouse gases. This paper considers whether negotiations can succeed in reaching an agreement that effectively addresses the climate change problem. To be effective, a climate agreement must cause substantial emissions reductions either directly (in the agreement's own lifetime) or indirectly (by paving the way for a future agreement that causes substantial emissions reductions directly). To reduce global emissions substantially, an agreement must satisfy three conditions. Firstly, participation must be both comprehensive and stable. Secondly, participating countries must accept deep commitments. Finally, the agreement must obtain high compliance rates. We argue that three types of enforcement will be crucial to fulfilling these three conditions: (1) incentives for countries to ratify with deep commitments, (2) incentives for countries that have ratified with deep commitments to abstain from withdrawal, and (3) incentives for countries having ratified with deep commitments to comply with them. Based on assessing the constraints that characterize the climate change negotiations, we contend that adopting such three-fold potent enforcement will likely be politically infeasible, not only within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, but also in the framework of a more gradual approach. Therefore, one should not expect climate change negotiations to succeed in producing an effective future agreement—either directly or indirectly.
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spelling en-USCan Climate Change Negotiations Succeed?Hovi, JonSkodvin, ToraAakre, Stineclimate change negotiations; compliance; cooperation; enforcement; participation; political feasibilityhttps://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v1i2.96DOIhttps://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/view/96URLHasVersionhttps://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/view/96/74URLHasVersionhttps://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v1i2.96DOI2013-09-20http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2en-USMore than two decades of climate change negotiations have produced a series of global climate agreements, such as the Kyoto Protocol and the Copenhagen Accords, but have nevertheless made very limited progress in curbing global emissions of greenhouse gases. This paper considers whether negotiations can succeed in reaching an agreement that effectively addresses the climate change problem. To be effective, a climate agreement must cause substantial emissions reductions either directly (in the agreement's own lifetime) or indirectly (by paving the way for a future agreement that causes substantial emissions reductions directly). To reduce global emissions substantially, an agreement must satisfy three conditions. Firstly, participation must be both comprehensive and stable. Secondly, participating countries must accept deep commitments. Finally, the agreement must obtain high compliance rates. We argue that three types of enforcement will be crucial to fulfilling these three conditions: (1) incentives for countries to ratify with deep commitments, (2) incentives for countries that have ratified with deep commitments to abstain from withdrawal, and (3) incentives for countries having ratified with deep commitments to comply with them. Based on assessing the constraints that characterize the climate change negotiations, we contend that adopting such three-fold potent enforcement will likely be politically infeasible, not only within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, but also in the framework of a more gradual approach. Therefore, one should not expect climate change negotiations to succeed in producing an effective future agreement—either directly or indirectly.Cogitatio Pressapplication/pdfen-USPolitics and Governance; Vol 1, No 2 (2013): Multidisciplinary Studies in Politics and Governance; 138-1502183-246310.17645/pag.i13engjournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501literatureVoRhttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85
spellingShingle Can Climate Change Negotiations Succeed?
Hovi, Jon
climate change negotiations; compliance; cooperation; enforcement; participation; political feasibility
status_str VoR
subject.fl_str_mv climate change negotiations; compliance; cooperation; enforcement; participation; political feasibility
title Can Climate Change Negotiations Succeed?
title_full Can Climate Change Negotiations Succeed?
title_fullStr Can Climate Change Negotiations Succeed?
title_full_unstemmed Can Climate Change Negotiations Succeed?
title_short Can Climate Change Negotiations Succeed?
title_sort Can Climate Change Negotiations Succeed?
topic climate change negotiations; compliance; cooperation; enforcement; participation; political feasibility
topic_facet climate change negotiations; compliance; cooperation; enforcement; participation; political feasibility
url https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v1i2.96
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