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Market competition and executive pay

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Resumo:Empirical evidence suggests that executive pay is related to the level of product-market competition. However, while most shocks or policy reforms that foster competition tend to strengthen the link between competition and performance-related pay, it can also be the case that increasing competition reduces incentives. Also, as firms may change their pay structures, the effect of changes in competition to CEOs’ pay is uncertain. Policies aimed at reducing wage inequality or at affecting the provision of incentives should consider market idiosyncrasies as well as taking these different effects into account.
Autores principais:Ferreira, Priscila
Assunto:Barriers to entry Entry costs Competition Executive compensation Performance-related pay
Ano:2015
País:Portugal
Tipo de documento:artigo
Tipo de acesso:acesso restrito
Instituição associada:Universidade do Minho
Idioma:inglês
Origem:RepositóriUM - Universidade do Minho

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