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A blurring of roles: use of force in UN peacekeeping

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Resumo:There is a sober paradox involved in the use of oxymoron ‘peace operations’, as these operations, traditionally anchored on the bedrock principles of UN peacekeeping - consent of the parties, impartiality, and non-use of force except in self-defence -, are being increasingly transformed into enforcement operations. Twenty-seven years after the end of the Cold War and the rebirth of the United Nations’ (UN) security role, peacekeeping operations are increasingly losing ground to an emerging pattern of more aggressive, offensive operations. They have an essentially hybrid nature, involving elements of both peacekeeping and enforcement. Although many see them as alternative, non-reconcilable techniques, politicians and practitioners do not see a sharp dividing line separating non-coercive and enforcement tasks, permitting an easy transition from one to the other.
Autores principais:Pinto Arena, Maria do Céu
Assunto:UN peacekeeping operations (PKO) Use of force Enforcement Consent Hybrid operations Asymmetric environments
Ano:2017
País:Portugal
Tipo de documento:artigo
Tipo de acesso:acesso aberto
Instituição associada:Universidade do Minho
Idioma:inglês
Origem:RepositóriUM - Universidade do Minho
Descrição
Resumo:There is a sober paradox involved in the use of oxymoron ‘peace operations’, as these operations, traditionally anchored on the bedrock principles of UN peacekeeping - consent of the parties, impartiality, and non-use of force except in self-defence -, are being increasingly transformed into enforcement operations. Twenty-seven years after the end of the Cold War and the rebirth of the United Nations’ (UN) security role, peacekeeping operations are increasingly losing ground to an emerging pattern of more aggressive, offensive operations. They have an essentially hybrid nature, involving elements of both peacekeeping and enforcement. Although many see them as alternative, non-reconcilable techniques, politicians and practitioners do not see a sharp dividing line separating non-coercive and enforcement tasks, permitting an easy transition from one to the other.