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ADSNARK: Nearly practical and privacy-preserving proofs on authenticated data

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Resumo:We study the problem of privacy-preserving proofs on authenticated data, where a party receives data from a trusted source and is requested to prove computations over the data to third parties in a correct and private way, i.e., the third party learns no information on the data but is still assured that the claimed proof is valid. Our work particularly focuses on the challenging requirement that the third party should be able to verify the validity with respect to the specific data authenticated by the source — even without having access to that source. This problem is motivated by various scenarios emerging from several application areas such as wearable computing, smart metering, or general business-to-business interactions. Furthermore, these applications also demand any meaningful solution to satisfy additional properties related to usability and scalability. In this paper, we formalize the above three-party model, discuss concrete application scenarios, and then we design, build, and evaluate ADSNARK, a nearly practical system for proving arbitrary computations over authenticated data in a privacy-preserving manner. ADSNARK improves significantly over state-of-the-art solutions for this model. For instance, compared to corresponding solutions based on Pinocchio (Oakland’13), ADSNARK achieves up to 25× improvement in proof-computation time and a 20× reduction in prover storage space.
Autores principais:Backes, Michael
Outros Autores:Barbosa, Manuel; Fiore, Dario; Reischuk, Raphael M.
Assunto:authentication privacy privacy-preserving proofs Engenharia e Tecnologia::Engenharia Eletrotécnica, Eletrónica e Informática
Ano:2015
País:Portugal
Tipo de documento:comunicação em conferência
Tipo de acesso:acesso aberto
Instituição associada:Universidade do Minho
Idioma:inglês
Origem:RepositóriUM - Universidade do Minho
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author Backes, Michael
author2 Barbosa, Manuel
Fiore, Dario
Reischuk, Raphael M.
author2_role author
author
author
author_facet Backes, Michael
Barbosa, Manuel
Fiore, Dario
Reischuk, Raphael M.
author_role author
contributor_name_str_mv RepositóriUM - Universidade do Minho
country_str PT
creators_json_txt [{\"Person.name\":\"Backes, Michael\"},{\"Person.name\":\"Barbosa, Manuel\"},{\"Person.name\":\"Fiore, Dario\"},{\"Person.name\":\"Reischuk, Raphael M.\"}]
datacite.contributors.contributor.contributorName.fl_str_mv RepositóriUM - Universidade do Minho
datacite.creators.creator.creatorName.fl_str_mv Backes, Michael
Barbosa, Manuel
Fiore, Dario
Reischuk, Raphael M.
datacite.date.Accepted.fl_str_mv 2015-05-01T00:00:00Z
datacite.date.available.fl_str_mv 2016-03-02T15:18:33Z
datacite.date.embargoed.fl_str_mv 2016-03-02T15:18:33Z
datacite.rights.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
datacite.subjects.subject.fl_str_mv authentication
privacy
privacy-preserving proofs
Engenharia e Tecnologia::Engenharia Eletrotécnica, Eletrónica e Informática
datacite.titles.title.fl_str_mv ADSNARK: Nearly practical and privacy-preserving proofs on authenticated data
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv RepositóriUM - Universidade do Minho
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Backes, Michael
Barbosa, Manuel
Fiore, Dario
Reischuk, Raphael M.
dc.date.Accepted.fl_str_mv 2015-05-01T00:00:00Z
dc.date.available.fl_str_mv 2016-03-02T15:18:33Z
dc.date.embargoed.fl_str_mv 2016-03-02T15:18:33Z
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv https://hdl.handle.net/1822/40604
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv IEEE
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv authentication
privacy
privacy-preserving proofs
Engenharia e Tecnologia::Engenharia Eletrotécnica, Eletrónica e Informática
dc.title.fl_str_mv ADSNARK: Nearly practical and privacy-preserving proofs on authenticated data
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_5794
description We study the problem of privacy-preserving proofs on authenticated data, where a party receives data from a trusted source and is requested to prove computations over the data to third parties in a correct and private way, i.e., the third party learns no information on the data but is still assured that the claimed proof is valid. Our work particularly focuses on the challenging requirement that the third party should be able to verify the validity with respect to the specific data authenticated by the source — even without having access to that source. This problem is motivated by various scenarios emerging from several application areas such as wearable computing, smart metering, or general business-to-business interactions. Furthermore, these applications also demand any meaningful solution to satisfy additional properties related to usability and scalability. In this paper, we formalize the above three-party model, discuss concrete application scenarios, and then we design, build, and evaluate ADSNARK, a nearly practical system for proving arbitrary computations over authenticated data in a privacy-preserving manner. ADSNARK improves significantly over state-of-the-art solutions for this model. For instance, compared to corresponding solutions based on Pinocchio (Oakland’13), ADSNARK achieves up to 25× improvement in proof-computation time and a 20× reduction in prover storage space.
dirty 0
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
format conferencePaper
fulltext.url.fl_str_mv https://repositorium.uminho.pt/bitstreams/ddc5b9c0-3bee-4caf-a9c6-8ca674f5e317/download
id rum_b551cfd357d3cb7c8bc73b5800aadb14
identifier.url.fl_str_mv https://hdl.handle.net/1822/40604
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institution Universidade do Minho
instname_str Universidade do Minho
language eng
network_acronym_str rum
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oai_identifier_str oai:repositorium.uminho.pt:1822/40604
organization_str_mv urn:organizationAcronym:repositorium
person_str_mv Backes, Michael
Barbosa, Manuel
Fiore, Dario
Reischuk, Raphael M.
publishDate 2015
publisher.none.fl_str_mv IEEE
reponame_str RepositóriUM - Universidade do Minho
repository_id_str urn:repositoryAcronym:rum
service_str_mv urn:repositoryAcronym:rum
spelling engIEEEporWe study the problem of privacy-preserving proofs on authenticated data, where a party receives data from a trusted source and is requested to prove computations over the data to third parties in a correct and private way, i.e., the third party learns no information on the data but is still assured that the claimed proof is valid. Our work particularly focuses on the challenging requirement that the third party should be able to verify the validity with respect to the specific data authenticated by the source — even without having access to that source. This problem is motivated by various scenarios emerging from several application areas such as wearable computing, smart metering, or general business-to-business interactions. Furthermore, these applications also demand any meaningful solution to satisfy additional properties related to usability and scalability. In this paper, we formalize the above three-party model, discuss concrete application scenarios, and then we design, build, and evaluate ADSNARK, a nearly practical system for proving arbitrary computations over authenticated data in a privacy-preserving manner. ADSNARK improves significantly over state-of-the-art solutions for this model. For instance, compared to corresponding solutions based on Pinocchio (Oakland’13), ADSNARK achieves up to 25× improvement in proof-computation time and a 20× reduction in prover storage space.application/pdfporADSNARK: Nearly practical and privacy-preserving proofs on authenticated dataBackes, MichaelBarbosa, ManuelFiore, DarioReischuk, Raphael M.HostingInstitutionOrganizationalRepositóriUM - Universidade do Minhoe-mailmailto:repositorium@usdb.uminho.ptrepositorium@usdb.uminho.ptCITATIONBackes, M., Barbosa, M., Fiore, D., & Reischuk, R. M. (2015). ADSNARK: Nearly practical and privacy-preserving proofs on authenticated data. Paper presented at the Proceedings - IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy.ISBNIsPartOf9781467369497ISSNIsPartOf1081-6011DOIIsPartOf10.1109/SP.2015.242016-03-02T15:18:33Z2015-052015-05-01T00:00:00ZHandlehttps://hdl.handle.net/1822/40604http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2open accessauthenticationprivacyprivacy-preserving proofshttp://www.oecd.org/science/inno/38235147.pdfFields of Science and Technology (FOS)Engenharia e Tecnologia::Engenharia Eletrotécnica, Eletrónica e Informática967080 bytesother research producthttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_5794conference paperhttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2application/pdffulltexthttps://repositorium.uminho.pt/bitstreams/ddc5b9c0-3bee-4caf-a9c6-8ca674f5e317/download
spellingShingle ADSNARK: Nearly practical and privacy-preserving proofs on authenticated data
Backes, Michael
authentication
privacy
privacy-preserving proofs
Engenharia e Tecnologia::Engenharia Eletrotécnica, Eletrónica e Informática
status SINGLETON
subject.fl_str_mv authentication
privacy
privacy-preserving proofs
subject.other.fl_str_mv Engenharia e Tecnologia::Engenharia Eletrotécnica, Eletrónica e Informática
title ADSNARK: Nearly practical and privacy-preserving proofs on authenticated data
title_full ADSNARK: Nearly practical and privacy-preserving proofs on authenticated data
title_fullStr ADSNARK: Nearly practical and privacy-preserving proofs on authenticated data
title_full_unstemmed ADSNARK: Nearly practical and privacy-preserving proofs on authenticated data
title_short ADSNARK: Nearly practical and privacy-preserving proofs on authenticated data
title_sort ADSNARK: Nearly practical and privacy-preserving proofs on authenticated data
topic authentication
privacy
privacy-preserving proofs
Engenharia e Tecnologia::Engenharia Eletrotécnica, Eletrónica e Informática
topic_facet authentication
privacy
privacy-preserving proofs
Engenharia e Tecnologia::Engenharia Eletrotécnica, Eletrónica e Informática
url https://hdl.handle.net/1822/40604
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