Publicação
Investment and quality competition in healthcare markets
| Resumo: | We study the strategic relationship between hospital investment and provision of service quality. We use a spatial competition framework and allow investment and quality to be complements or substitutes in patient benefit and provider cost. We assume that each hospital commits to a certain investment before deciding on service quality, and that investment is observable and contractible while quality is observable but not contractible. We show that, under a fixed DRG-pricing system, providers’ lack of ability to commit to quality leads to under- or overinvestment, relative to the first-best solution. Underinvestment arises when the price-cost margin is positive, and quality and investments are strategic complements, which has implications for optimal contracting. Differently from the simultaneous-move case, the regulator must complement the payment with one more instrument to address under/overinvestment. We also analyse the welfare effects of different policy options (separate payment for investment, higher per-treatment prices, or DRG-refinement policies). |
|---|---|
| Autores principais: | Ghandour, Ziad |
| Outros Autores: | Siciliani, Luigi; Straume, Odd Rune |
| Assunto: | Hospital payment Investment Quality competition |
| Ano: | 2022 |
| País: | Portugal |
| Tipo de documento: | artigo |
| Tipo de acesso: | acesso aberto |
| Instituição associada: | Universidade do Minho |
| Idioma: | inglês |
| Origem: | RepositóriUM - Universidade do Minho |
| _version_ | 1867438483092537344 |
|---|---|
| author | Ghandour, Ziad |
| author2 | Siciliani, Luigi Straume, Odd Rune |
| author2_role | author author |
| author_facet | Ghandour, Ziad Siciliani, Luigi Straume, Odd Rune |
| author_role | author |
| contributor_name_str_mv | RepositóriUM - Universidade do Minho |
| country_str | PT |
| creators_json_txt | [{\"Person.name\":\"Ghandour, Ziad\"},{\"Person.name\":\"Siciliani, Luigi\"},{\"Person.name\":\"Straume, Odd Rune\"}] |
| datacite.contributors.contributor.contributorName.fl_str_mv | RepositóriUM - Universidade do Minho |
| datacite.creators.creator.creatorName.fl_str_mv | Ghandour, Ziad Siciliani, Luigi Straume, Odd Rune |
| datacite.date.Accepted.fl_str_mv | 2022-01-01T00:00:00Z |
| datacite.date.available.fl_str_mv | 2024-01-14T07:00:29Z |
| datacite.date.embargoed.fl_str_mv | 2024-01-14T07:00:29Z |
| datacite.rights.fl_str_mv | http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 |
| datacite.subjects.subject.fl_str_mv | Hospital payment Investment Quality competition |
| datacite.titles.title.fl_str_mv | Investment and quality competition in healthcare markets |
| dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv | RepositóriUM - Universidade do Minho |
| dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv | Ghandour, Ziad Siciliani, Luigi Straume, Odd Rune |
| dc.date.Accepted.fl_str_mv | 2022-01-01T00:00:00Z |
| dc.date.available.fl_str_mv | 2024-01-14T07:00:29Z |
| dc.date.embargoed.fl_str_mv | 2024-01-14T07:00:29Z |
| dc.format.none.fl_str_mv | application/pdf |
| dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv | https://hdl.handle.net/1822/76487 |
| dc.language.none.fl_str_mv | eng |
| dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv | Elsevier |
| dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv | http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 |
| dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv | Hospital payment Investment Quality competition |
| dc.title.fl_str_mv | Investment and quality competition in healthcare markets |
| dc.type.none.fl_str_mv | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 |
| description | We study the strategic relationship between hospital investment and provision of service quality. We use a spatial competition framework and allow investment and quality to be complements or substitutes in patient benefit and provider cost. We assume that each hospital commits to a certain investment before deciding on service quality, and that investment is observable and contractible while quality is observable but not contractible. We show that, under a fixed DRG-pricing system, providers’ lack of ability to commit to quality leads to under- or overinvestment, relative to the first-best solution. Underinvestment arises when the price-cost margin is positive, and quality and investments are strategic complements, which has implications for optimal contracting. Differently from the simultaneous-move case, the regulator must complement the payment with one more instrument to address under/overinvestment. We also analyse the welfare effects of different policy options (separate payment for investment, higher per-treatment prices, or DRG-refinement policies). |
| dirty | 0 |
| eu_rights_str_mv | openAccess |
| format | article |
| fulltext.url.fl_str_mv | https://repositorium.uminho.pt/bitstreams/837782b6-f237-415a-8a24-72e2e8b1ee9a/download |
| id | rum_bb060caef901fc603e2d7ebf2e9b765f |
| identifier.url.fl_str_mv | https://hdl.handle.net/1822/76487 |
| instacron_str | repositorium |
| institution | Universidade do Minho |
| instname_str | Universidade do Minho |
| language | eng |
| network_acronym_str | rum |
| network_name_str | RepositóriUM - Universidade do Minho |
| oai_identifier_str | oai:repositorium.uminho.pt:1822/76487 |
| organization_str_mv | urn:organizationAcronym:repositorium |
| person_str_mv | Ghandour, Ziad Siciliani, Luigi Straume, Odd Rune |
| publishDate | 2022 |
| publisher.none.fl_str_mv | Elsevier |
| reponame_str | RepositóriUM - Universidade do Minho |
| repository_id_str | urn:repositoryAcronym:rum |
| service_str_mv | urn:repositoryAcronym:rum |
| spelling | engElsevierporWe study the strategic relationship between hospital investment and provision of service quality. We use a spatial competition framework and allow investment and quality to be complements or substitutes in patient benefit and provider cost. We assume that each hospital commits to a certain investment before deciding on service quality, and that investment is observable and contractible while quality is observable but not contractible. We show that, under a fixed DRG-pricing system, providers’ lack of ability to commit to quality leads to under- or overinvestment, relative to the first-best solution. Underinvestment arises when the price-cost margin is positive, and quality and investments are strategic complements, which has implications for optimal contracting. Differently from the simultaneous-move case, the regulator must complement the payment with one more instrument to address under/overinvestment. We also analyse the welfare effects of different policy options (separate payment for investment, higher per-treatment prices, or DRG-refinement policies).application/pdfporInvestment and quality competition in healthcare marketsGhandour, ZiadSiciliani, LuigiStraume, Odd RuneHostingInstitutionOrganizationalRepositóriUM - Universidade do Minhoe-mailmailto:repositorium@usdb.uminho.ptrepositorium@usdb.uminho.ptCITATIONGhandour, Z., Siciliani, L., & Straume, O. R. (2022, March). Investment and quality competition in healthcare markets. Journal of Health Economics. Elsevier BV. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2022.102588PMID35065851ISSNIsPartOf0167-6296DOIIsPartOf10.1016/j.jhealeco.2022.1025882024-01-14T07:00:29Z20222022-03-11T11:38:08Z2022-01-01T00:00:00ZHandlehttps://hdl.handle.net/1822/76487http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2open accessHospital paymentInvestmentQuality competition476311 bytesliteraturehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501journal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2application/pdffulltexthttps://repositorium.uminho.pt/bitstreams/837782b6-f237-415a-8a24-72e2e8b1ee9a/download |
| spellingShingle | Investment and quality competition in healthcare markets Ghandour, Ziad Hospital payment Investment Quality competition |
| status | SINGLETON |
| subject.fl_str_mv | Hospital payment Investment Quality competition |
| title | Investment and quality competition in healthcare markets |
| title_full | Investment and quality competition in healthcare markets |
| title_fullStr | Investment and quality competition in healthcare markets |
| title_full_unstemmed | Investment and quality competition in healthcare markets |
| title_short | Investment and quality competition in healthcare markets |
| title_sort | Investment and quality competition in healthcare markets |
| topic | Hospital payment Investment Quality competition |
| topic_facet | Hospital payment Investment Quality competition |
| url | https://hdl.handle.net/1822/76487 |
| visible | 1 |