Publicação
Studies on ecological fiscal transfers in Brazil
| Resumo: | This thesis focuses on the process of formulating and implementing ecological fiscal transfers (EFT) in Brazil at the state level and their consequences at the local-level decisions concerning biodiversity conservation policies. The theoretical lens is based firmly on the transaction cost-politics theory proposed by Douglass North and followed by other authors, such as Avinash Dixit, Murray Horn, David Epstein and Sharyn O0Halloran. The thesis comprises three essays which jointly advance the EFT literature providing theoretical and empirical evidence that the transaction costs can facilitate or complicate the formulation and implementation of the EFT at the state and local level. More precisely, the first essay describes and explains the process of adopting EFT across Brazilian states from 1990 to 2015. The second essay argues that the legislative branch tends to minimize the costs at the policy-making stage and the legislative branch delegates to the state agencies the role to refine EFT procedures and, accordingly, increase the costs to them. The third essay argues that an EFT schema designed at the state level affects the commitment costs of local level decisions and, due to agency costs, the time length to create PA. More broadly, the findings of this thesis provide evidence that the probability of adopting the EFT is higher in a nonelectoral year, demonstrating that politicians tend to avoid conflicts during electoral years and, accordingly, to minimize the costs related to the legislative decision-making process. Also, the probability of reducing the time to adopt the EFT is lower when the state government imposes a gradual implementation of the percentage dedicated to environmental criteria to municipalities. In addition, it provides evidence of absence of technical and human resources at the environmental state agencies that can lead to agency problems, and issues related to party-ideology and political coalitions which may increase the legislative-decision making costs. The uncertainty of the EFT revenue increases the commitment costs and shape local decisions to choose the best institutional arrangement which tend not to lose their discretion so much in the moment of adopting local protected area. It also provides empirical evidence that the quality index of protected areas imposes additional costs to local governments. |
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| Autores principais: | Paulo, Felipe Luiz Lima de |
| Assunto: | Policy adoption Protected areas Ecological fiscal transfers Transaction cost theory Brazil Adoção de políticas Áreas protegidas Transferências fiscais ecológicas Teoria dos custos políticos de transação Brasil |
| Ano: | 2019 |
| País: | Portugal |
| Tipo de documento: | tese de doutoramento |
| Tipo de acesso: | acesso aberto |
| Instituição associada: | Universidade do Minho |
| Idioma: | inglês |
| Origem: | RepositóriUM - Universidade do Minho |
| Resumo: | This thesis focuses on the process of formulating and implementing ecological fiscal transfers (EFT) in Brazil at the state level and their consequences at the local-level decisions concerning biodiversity conservation policies. The theoretical lens is based firmly on the transaction cost-politics theory proposed by Douglass North and followed by other authors, such as Avinash Dixit, Murray Horn, David Epstein and Sharyn O0Halloran. The thesis comprises three essays which jointly advance the EFT literature providing theoretical and empirical evidence that the transaction costs can facilitate or complicate the formulation and implementation of the EFT at the state and local level. More precisely, the first essay describes and explains the process of adopting EFT across Brazilian states from 1990 to 2015. The second essay argues that the legislative branch tends to minimize the costs at the policy-making stage and the legislative branch delegates to the state agencies the role to refine EFT procedures and, accordingly, increase the costs to them. The third essay argues that an EFT schema designed at the state level affects the commitment costs of local level decisions and, due to agency costs, the time length to create PA. More broadly, the findings of this thesis provide evidence that the probability of adopting the EFT is higher in a nonelectoral year, demonstrating that politicians tend to avoid conflicts during electoral years and, accordingly, to minimize the costs related to the legislative decision-making process. Also, the probability of reducing the time to adopt the EFT is lower when the state government imposes a gradual implementation of the percentage dedicated to environmental criteria to municipalities. In addition, it provides evidence of absence of technical and human resources at the environmental state agencies that can lead to agency problems, and issues related to party-ideology and political coalitions which may increase the legislative-decision making costs. The uncertainty of the EFT revenue increases the commitment costs and shape local decisions to choose the best institutional arrangement which tend not to lose their discretion so much in the moment of adopting local protected area. It also provides empirical evidence that the quality index of protected areas imposes additional costs to local governments. |
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