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Employment protection and unemployment benefits: on technology adoption and job creation in a matching model

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Resumo:We analyse the effects of different labour-market policies (employment protection, unemployment benefits, and payroll taxes) on job creation and technology choices in a model where firms are matched with workers of different productivity and wages are determined by ex post bargaining. The model is characterized by two intertwined sources of inefficiency, namely a matching externality and a hold-up externality associated with the bargaining strength of workers. The results depend on the relative importance of the two externalities and on worker risk aversion. Flexicurity, meaning low employment protection and generous unemployment insurance, can be optimal if workers are sufficiently risk-averse and the hold-up problem is relatively important.
Autores principais:Lommerud, Kjell Erik
Outros Autores:Straume, Odd Rune; Vagstad, Steinar
Assunto:Flexicurity unemployment insurance
Ano:2018
País:Portugal
Tipo de documento:artigo
Tipo de acesso:acesso aberto
Instituição associada:Universidade do Minho
Idioma:inglês
Origem:RepositóriUM - Universidade do Minho

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