Publicação

A dynamic model of quality competition with endogenous prices

Ver documento

Detalhes bibliográficos
Resumo:We develop a dynamic model of price and quality competition in order to analyse the effects of competition intensity on quality provision and to which extent an unregulated market is able to provide a socially optimal quality level. Using a differential-game approach with price and quality competition on a Hotelling line, we compare the benchmark open-loop solution against the feedback closed-loop solution, which implies strategic dynamic interaction over time. We find that steady-state quality in the closed-loop solution is (i) increasing in the degree of competition between firms, (ii) lower than in the open-loop solution, and (iii) lower than the socially optimal level. In contrast, steady-state quality in the open-loop solution is at the socially optimal level and independent of competition intensity. Thus, our analysis identifies dynamic strategic interactions between competing firms as an independent source of inefficiency in quality provision.
Autores principais:Cellini, Roberto
Outros Autores:Siciliani, Luigi; Straume, Odd Rune
Assunto:Competition Quality Differential-games Ciências Sociais::Economia e Gestão
Ano:2015
País:Portugal
Tipo de documento:working paper
Tipo de acesso:acesso aberto
Instituição associada:Universidade do Minho
Idioma:inglês
Origem:RepositóriUM - Universidade do Minho
_version_ 1867439769227624448
author Cellini, Roberto
author2 Siciliani, Luigi
Straume, Odd Rune
author2_role author
author
author_facet Cellini, Roberto
Siciliani, Luigi
Straume, Odd Rune
author_role author
contributor_name_str_mv RepositóriUM - Universidade do Minho
country_str PT
creators_json_txt [{\"Person.name\":\"Cellini, Roberto\"},{\"Person.name\":\"Siciliani, Luigi\"},{\"Person.name\":\"Straume, Odd Rune\"}]
datacite.contributors.contributor.contributorName.fl_str_mv RepositóriUM - Universidade do Minho
datacite.creators.creator.creatorName.fl_str_mv Cellini, Roberto
Siciliani, Luigi
Straume, Odd Rune
datacite.date.Accepted.fl_str_mv 2015-01-01T00:00:00Z
datacite.date.available.fl_str_mv 2015-07-24T15:25:42Z
datacite.date.embargoed.fl_str_mv 2015-07-24T15:25:42Z
datacite.rights.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
datacite.subjects.subject.fl_str_mv Competition
Quality
Differential-games
Ciências Sociais::Economia e Gestão
datacite.titles.title.fl_str_mv A dynamic model of quality competition with endogenous prices
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv RepositóriUM - Universidade do Minho
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Cellini, Roberto
Siciliani, Luigi
Straume, Odd Rune
dc.date.Accepted.fl_str_mv 2015-01-01T00:00:00Z
dc.date.available.fl_str_mv 2015-07-24T15:25:42Z
dc.date.embargoed.fl_str_mv 2015-07-24T15:25:42Z
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv https://hdl.handle.net/1822/36422
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade do Minho. Núcleo de Investigação em Políticas Económicas (NIPE)
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Competition
Quality
Differential-games
Ciências Sociais::Economia e Gestão
dc.title.fl_str_mv A dynamic model of quality competition with endogenous prices
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042
description We develop a dynamic model of price and quality competition in order to analyse the effects of competition intensity on quality provision and to which extent an unregulated market is able to provide a socially optimal quality level. Using a differential-game approach with price and quality competition on a Hotelling line, we compare the benchmark open-loop solution against the feedback closed-loop solution, which implies strategic dynamic interaction over time. We find that steady-state quality in the closed-loop solution is (i) increasing in the degree of competition between firms, (ii) lower than in the open-loop solution, and (iii) lower than the socially optimal level. In contrast, steady-state quality in the open-loop solution is at the socially optimal level and independent of competition intensity. Thus, our analysis identifies dynamic strategic interactions between competing firms as an independent source of inefficiency in quality provision.
dirty 0
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
format workingPaper
fulltext.url.fl_str_mv https://repositorium.uminho.pt/bitstreams/7f1e4831-af21-4ee4-b6f3-72ce41617d73/download
id rum_f2764c8a4e8e8ddfd9d9f5e2baa9b494
identifier.url.fl_str_mv https://hdl.handle.net/1822/36422
instacron_str repositorium
institution Universidade do Minho
instname_str Universidade do Minho
language eng
network_acronym_str rum
network_name_str RepositóriUM - Universidade do Minho
oai_identifier_str oai:repositorium.uminho.pt:1822/36422
organization_str_mv urn:organizationAcronym:repositorium
person_str_mv Cellini, Roberto
Siciliani, Luigi
Straume, Odd Rune
publishDate 2015
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidade do Minho. Núcleo de Investigação em Políticas Económicas (NIPE)
reponame_str RepositóriUM - Universidade do Minho
repository_id_str urn:repositoryAcronym:rum
service_str_mv urn:repositoryAcronym:rum
spelling engUniversidade do Minho. Núcleo de Investigação em Políticas Económicas (NIPE)porWe develop a dynamic model of price and quality competition in order to analyse the effects of competition intensity on quality provision and to which extent an unregulated market is able to provide a socially optimal quality level. Using a differential-game approach with price and quality competition on a Hotelling line, we compare the benchmark open-loop solution against the feedback closed-loop solution, which implies strategic dynamic interaction over time. We find that steady-state quality in the closed-loop solution is (i) increasing in the degree of competition between firms, (ii) lower than in the open-loop solution, and (iii) lower than the socially optimal level. In contrast, steady-state quality in the open-loop solution is at the socially optimal level and independent of competition intensity. Thus, our analysis identifies dynamic strategic interactions between competing firms as an independent source of inefficiency in quality provision.application/pdfporA dynamic model of quality competition with endogenous pricesCellini, RobertoSiciliani, LuigiStraume, Odd RuneHostingInstitutionOrganizationalRepositóriUM - Universidade do Minhoe-mailmailto:repositorium@usdb.uminho.ptrepositorium@usdb.uminho.pt2015-07-24T15:25:42Z20152015-01-01T00:00:00ZHandlehttps://hdl.handle.net/1822/36422http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2open accessCompetitionQualityDifferential-gameshttp://www.oecd.org/science/inno/38235147.pdfFields of Science and Technology (FOS)Ciências Sociais::Economia e Gestão493015 bytesother research producthttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042working paperhttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2application/pdffulltexthttps://repositorium.uminho.pt/bitstreams/7f1e4831-af21-4ee4-b6f3-72ce41617d73/download
spellingShingle A dynamic model of quality competition with endogenous prices
Cellini, Roberto
Competition
Quality
Differential-games
Ciências Sociais::Economia e Gestão
status SINGLETON
subject.fl_str_mv Competition
Quality
Differential-games
subject.other.fl_str_mv Ciências Sociais::Economia e Gestão
title A dynamic model of quality competition with endogenous prices
title_full A dynamic model of quality competition with endogenous prices
title_fullStr A dynamic model of quality competition with endogenous prices
title_full_unstemmed A dynamic model of quality competition with endogenous prices
title_short A dynamic model of quality competition with endogenous prices
title_sort A dynamic model of quality competition with endogenous prices
topic Competition
Quality
Differential-games
Ciências Sociais::Economia e Gestão
topic_facet Competition
Quality
Differential-games
Ciências Sociais::Economia e Gestão
url https://hdl.handle.net/1822/36422
visible 1