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Three Notes on Symmetric Games with Asymmetric Equilibria

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Resumo:It is often the case in symmetric games in normal form that the only existing pure-strategy equilibria are asymmetric. If there is an asymmetric equilibrium for a model with N 'equal" players, then there are multiple equilibria, only differing on the "name" of the players 'assigned" to each one of the actions which together form an equilibrium. A natural question to ask Is, then, how to select among these equilibria. In this note, we show that in symmetric games with a large number of players, an asymmetric pure-strategy equilibrium can be thought of as the approximate outcome of the play of a specific symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium.
Autores principais:Cabral, Luís M. B.
Ano:1987
País:Portugal
Tipo de documento:working paper
Tipo de acesso:acesso aberto
Instituição associada:Universidade Nova de Lisboa
Idioma:inglês
Origem:Repositório Institucional da UNL
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author Cabral, Luís M. B.
author_facet Cabral, Luís M. B.
author_role author
contributor_name_str_mv RUN
country_str PT
creators_json_txt [{\"Person.name\":\"Cabral, Luís M. B.\"}]
datacite.contributors.contributor.contributorName.fl_str_mv RUN
datacite.creators.creator.creatorName.fl_str_mv Cabral, Luís M. B.
datacite.date.Accepted.fl_str_mv 1987-11-01T00:00:00Z
datacite.date.available.fl_str_mv 2019-10-10T15:10:17Z
datacite.date.embargoed.fl_str_mv 2019-10-10T15:10:17Z
datacite.rights.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
datacite.titles.title.fl_str_mv Three Notes on Symmetric Games with Asymmetric Equilibria
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv RUN
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Cabral, Luís M. B.
dc.date.Accepted.fl_str_mv 1987-11-01T00:00:00Z
dc.date.available.fl_str_mv 2019-10-10T15:10:17Z
dc.date.embargoed.fl_str_mv 2019-10-10T15:10:17Z
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10362/83874
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Nova SBE
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
dc.title.fl_str_mv Three Notes on Symmetric Games with Asymmetric Equilibria
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042
description It is often the case in symmetric games in normal form that the only existing pure-strategy equilibria are asymmetric. If there is an asymmetric equilibrium for a model with N 'equal" players, then there are multiple equilibria, only differing on the "name" of the players 'assigned" to each one of the actions which together form an equilibrium. A natural question to ask Is, then, how to select among these equilibria. In this note, we show that in symmetric games with a large number of players, an asymmetric pure-strategy equilibrium can be thought of as the approximate outcome of the play of a specific symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium.
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institution Universidade Nova de Lisboa
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organization_str_mv urn:organizationAcronym:unl
person_str_mv Cabral, Luís M. B.
publishDate 1987
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Nova SBE
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spelling engNova SBEIt is often the case in symmetric games in normal form that the only existing pure-strategy equilibria are asymmetric. If there is an asymmetric equilibrium for a model with N 'equal" players, then there are multiple equilibria, only differing on the "name" of the players 'assigned" to each one of the actions which together form an equilibrium. A natural question to ask Is, then, how to select among these equilibria. In this note, we show that in symmetric games with a large number of players, an asymmetric pure-strategy equilibrium can be thought of as the approximate outcome of the play of a specific symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium.application/pdfpt_PTThree Notes on Symmetric Games with Asymmetric EquilibriaCabral, Luís M. B.HostingInstitutionOrganizationalRUNe-mailmailto:run@unl.ptrun@unl.pt2019-10-10T15:10:17Z1987-111987-11-01T00:00:00ZHandlehttp://hdl.handle.net/10362/83874http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2open access378777 bytesother research producthttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042working paperhttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2application/pdffulltexthttps://run.unl.pt/bitstreams/38ee2e2c-9afb-4ef3-ace2-3b5c24e50be7/download
spellingShingle Three Notes on Symmetric Games with Asymmetric Equilibria
Cabral, Luís M. B.
status SINGLETON
title Three Notes on Symmetric Games with Asymmetric Equilibria
title_full Three Notes on Symmetric Games with Asymmetric Equilibria
title_fullStr Three Notes on Symmetric Games with Asymmetric Equilibria
title_full_unstemmed Three Notes on Symmetric Games with Asymmetric Equilibria
title_short Three Notes on Symmetric Games with Asymmetric Equilibria
title_sort Three Notes on Symmetric Games with Asymmetric Equilibria
url http://hdl.handle.net/10362/83874
visible 1