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Three Notes on Symmetric Games with Asymmetric Equilibria

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Resumo:It is often the case in symmetric games in normal form that the only existing pure-strategy equilibria are asymmetric. If there is an asymmetric equilibrium for a model with N 'equal" players, then there are multiple equilibria, only differing on the "name" of the players 'assigned" to each one of the actions which together form an equilibrium. A natural question to ask Is, then, how to select among these equilibria. In this note, we show that in symmetric games with a large number of players, an asymmetric pure-strategy equilibrium can be thought of as the approximate outcome of the play of a specific symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium.
Autores principais:Cabral, Luís M. B.
Ano:1987
País:Portugal
Tipo de documento:working paper
Tipo de acesso:acesso aberto
Instituição associada:Universidade Nova de Lisboa
Idioma:inglês
Origem:Repositório Institucional da UNL

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