Publicação
Creditor control rights and board independence
| Resumo: | We find that the number of independent directors on corporate boards increases by approximately 24% following financial covenant violations in credit agreements. Most of these new directors have links to creditors. Firms that appoint new directors after violations are more likely to issue new equity, and to decrease payout, operational risk, and CEO cash compensation, than firms without such appointments. We conclude that a firm's board composition, governance, and policies are shaped by current and past credit agreements. |
|---|---|
| Autores principais: | Ferreira, Daniel |
| Outros Autores: | Ferreira, Miguel A.; Mariano, Beatriz |
| Assunto: | Accounting Finance Economics and Econometrics |
| Ano: | 2018 |
| País: | Portugal |
| Tipo de documento: | artigo |
| Tipo de acesso: | acesso aberto |
| Instituição associada: | Universidade Nova de Lisboa |
| Idioma: | inglês |
| Origem: | Repositório Institucional da UNL |
| _version_ | 1866752609083195392 |
|---|---|
| author | Ferreira, Daniel |
| author2 | Ferreira, Miguel A. Mariano, Beatriz |
| author2_role | author author |
| author_facet | Ferreira, Daniel Ferreira, Miguel A. Mariano, Beatriz |
| author_role | author |
| contributor_name_str_mv | NOVA School of Business and Economics (NOVA SBE) Wiley RUN |
| country_str | PT |
| creators_json_txt | [{\"Person.name\":\"Ferreira, Daniel\"},{\"Person.name\":\"Ferreira, Miguel A.\"},{\"Person.name\":\"Mariano, Beatriz\"}] |
| datacite.contributors.contributor.contributorName.fl_str_mv | NOVA School of Business and Economics (NOVA SBE) Wiley RUN |
| datacite.creators.creator.creatorName.fl_str_mv | Ferreira, Daniel Ferreira, Miguel A. Mariano, Beatriz |
| datacite.date.Accepted.fl_str_mv | 2018-10-01T00:00:00Z |
| datacite.date.available.fl_str_mv | 2023-06-01T00:32:01Z |
| datacite.date.embargoed.fl_str_mv | 2023-06-01T00:32:01Z |
| datacite.rights.fl_str_mv | http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 |
| datacite.subjects.subject.fl_str_mv | Accounting Finance Economics and Econometrics |
| datacite.titles.title.fl_str_mv | Creditor control rights and board independence |
| dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv | NOVA School of Business and Economics (NOVA SBE) Wiley RUN |
| dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv | Ferreira, Daniel Ferreira, Miguel A. Mariano, Beatriz |
| dc.date.Accepted.fl_str_mv | 2018-10-01T00:00:00Z |
| dc.date.available.fl_str_mv | 2023-06-01T00:32:01Z |
| dc.date.embargoed.fl_str_mv | 2023-06-01T00:32:01Z |
| dc.format.none.fl_str_mv | application/pdf |
| dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv | http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85050400216&partnerID=8YFLogxK |
| dc.language.none.fl_str_mv | eng |
| dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv | http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 |
| dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv | Accounting Finance Economics and Econometrics |
| dc.title.fl_str_mv | Creditor control rights and board independence |
| dc.type.none.fl_str_mv | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 |
| description | We find that the number of independent directors on corporate boards increases by approximately 24% following financial covenant violations in credit agreements. Most of these new directors have links to creditors. Firms that appoint new directors after violations are more likely to issue new equity, and to decrease payout, operational risk, and CEO cash compensation, than firms without such appointments. We conclude that a firm's board composition, governance, and policies are shaped by current and past credit agreements. |
| dirty | 0 |
| eu_rights_str_mv | openAccess |
| format | article |
| fulltext.url.fl_str_mv | https://run.unl.pt/bitstreams/02362ae3-7ebf-4210-bdcf-a257a51a26c3/download |
| id | run_bcff4e12eec6039ab6c478f3137cd8ad |
| identifier.url.fl_str_mv | http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85050400216&partnerID=8YFLogxK |
| instacron_str | unl |
| institution | Universidade Nova de Lisboa |
| instname_str | Universidade Nova de Lisboa |
| language | eng |
| network_acronym_str | run |
| network_name_str | Repositório Institucional da UNL |
| oai_identifier_str | oai:run.unl.pt:10362/83732 |
| organization_str_mv | urn:organizationAcronym:unl |
| person_str_mv | Ferreira, Daniel Ferreira, Miguel A. Mariano, Beatriz |
| publishDate | 2018 |
| reponame_str | Repositório Institucional da UNL |
| repository_id_str | urn:repositoryAcronym:run |
| service_str_mv | urn:repositoryAcronym:run |
| spelling | engenWe find that the number of independent directors on corporate boards increases by approximately 24% following financial covenant violations in credit agreements. Most of these new directors have links to creditors. Firms that appoint new directors after violations are more likely to issue new equity, and to decrease payout, operational risk, and CEO cash compensation, than firms without such appointments. We conclude that a firm's board composition, governance, and policies are shaped by current and past credit agreements.application/pdfenCreditor control rights and board independenceFerreira, DanielFerreira, Miguel A.Mariano, BeatrizNOVA School of Business and Economics (NOVA SBE)WileyHostingInstitutionOrganizationalRUNe-mailmailto:run@unl.ptrun@unl.ptISSNIsPartOf0022-1082URNIsPartOfPURE: 5667344URNIsPartOfPURE UUID: 10e94603-42fa-48cd-aa0a-7ae978f39ea3URNIsPartOfScopus: 85050400216URNIsPartOfWOS: 000447674600011DOIIsPartOf10.1111/jofi.126922023-06-01T00:32:01Z2018-102018-10-01T00:00:00ZURLhttp://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85050400216&partnerID=8YFLogxKhttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2open accessAccountingFinanceEconomics and Econometrics566445 bytesliteraturehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501journal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2application/pdffulltexthttps://run.unl.pt/bitstreams/02362ae3-7ebf-4210-bdcf-a257a51a26c3/download |
| spellingShingle | Creditor control rights and board independence Ferreira, Daniel Accounting Finance Economics and Econometrics |
| status | SINGLETON |
| subject.fl_str_mv | Accounting Finance Economics and Econometrics |
| title | Creditor control rights and board independence |
| title_full | Creditor control rights and board independence |
| title_fullStr | Creditor control rights and board independence |
| title_full_unstemmed | Creditor control rights and board independence |
| title_short | Creditor control rights and board independence |
| title_sort | Creditor control rights and board independence |
| topic | Accounting Finance Economics and Econometrics |
| topic_facet | Accounting Finance Economics and Econometrics |
| url | http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85050400216&partnerID=8YFLogxK |
| visible | 1 |