Publicação
The impact of corporate governance on post- M&A performance: a comparative analysis across two regions - an analysis of the effect of governance systems and board independence
| Resumo: | This study examines how corporate governance shapes post-M&A performance across Anglo Saxon and Continental European firms. Using 214 acquisitions and OLS regressions linking eight governance characteristics to changes in Tobin’s Q, the results show that governance effects are not uniform across institutional settings. Several characteristics matter only within specific institutional contexts, as governance system effects appear solely in Continental Europe, while a female director threshold effect emerges only in Anglo-Saxon firms. Further, board independence and CEO compensation influence outcomes through interaction terms. Blockholders, CEO duality, board size and board seniority show no consistent effects. Governance effectiveness is thus context-dependent and configuration-specific. The individual contribution focuses on governance system variables and board independence. The results show that governance system effects appear only in Continental Europe and have a marginally significant negative impact on post-M&A performance whereas board independence is negatively significant for Continental European firms |
|---|---|
| Autores principais: | Kreft, Jonas Sebastian |
| Assunto: | Corporate governance Mergers & acquisitions Post-M&A performance Board characteristic Blockholders Governance system CEO duality Board independence Board size Board seniority Gender diversity CEO compensation Anglo-Saxon Continental Europe Delta Tobin’s Q |
| Ano: | 2026 |
| País: | Portugal |
| Tipo de documento: | dissertação de mestrado |
| Tipo de acesso: | acesso aberto |
| Instituição associada: | Universidade Nova de Lisboa |
| Idioma: | inglês |
| Origem: | Repositório Institucional da UNL |
| Resumo: | This study examines how corporate governance shapes post-M&A performance across Anglo Saxon and Continental European firms. Using 214 acquisitions and OLS regressions linking eight governance characteristics to changes in Tobin’s Q, the results show that governance effects are not uniform across institutional settings. Several characteristics matter only within specific institutional contexts, as governance system effects appear solely in Continental Europe, while a female director threshold effect emerges only in Anglo-Saxon firms. Further, board independence and CEO compensation influence outcomes through interaction terms. Blockholders, CEO duality, board size and board seniority show no consistent effects. Governance effectiveness is thus context-dependent and configuration-specific. The individual contribution focuses on governance system variables and board independence. The results show that governance system effects appear only in Continental Europe and have a marginally significant negative impact on post-M&A performance whereas board independence is negatively significant for Continental European firms |
|---|