Publicação
An empirical analysis of the impact of mergers and acquisitions involving institutional cross-owners on post-merger bankruptcy risk of acquirers in the United States between 1984 and 2020
| Resumo: | I study 1858 mergers and acquisitions by US public acquirers between 1984 and 2020 to assess the impact of cross-ownership on post-M&A acquirer bankruptcy risk. Addressing a gap in existing literature, my statistically significant findings indicate that presence of cross ownership and a higher number of cross-owners decrease bankruptcy risk. Notably, risk is elevated with greater cross-ownership levels and larger cross-owner stakes in acquirers, explained by higher asymmetric information. Conversely, bigger cross-owner stakes in targets reduce bankruptcy risk. In conjunction with cross-ownership, greater executive motivation lowers risk, whereas interaction between higher number of cross-owners and monitoring increases post-M&A bankruptcy risk. |
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| Autores principais: | Zheltov, Petr |
| Assunto: | Corporate finance Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) Institutional investors Cross-ownership Bankruptcy risk Z-score model |
| Ano: | 2024 |
| País: | Portugal |
| Tipo de documento: | dissertação de mestrado |
| Tipo de acesso: | acesso aberto |
| Instituição associada: | Universidade Nova de Lisboa |
| Idioma: | inglês |
| Origem: | Repositório Institucional da UNL |
| Resumo: | I study 1858 mergers and acquisitions by US public acquirers between 1984 and 2020 to assess the impact of cross-ownership on post-M&A acquirer bankruptcy risk. Addressing a gap in existing literature, my statistically significant findings indicate that presence of cross ownership and a higher number of cross-owners decrease bankruptcy risk. Notably, risk is elevated with greater cross-ownership levels and larger cross-owner stakes in acquirers, explained by higher asymmetric information. Conversely, bigger cross-owner stakes in targets reduce bankruptcy risk. In conjunction with cross-ownership, greater executive motivation lowers risk, whereas interaction between higher number of cross-owners and monitoring increases post-M&A bankruptcy risk. |
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