Publicação
Automaticity and cognitive control : a dual process approach to reasoning under uncertainty
| Resumo: | I present a dual-process approach to judgment under uncertainty that is capable of retaining the explanatory power of the heuristics and biases research program (e.g., Tversky, Slovic, & Khaneman, 1982) but also able to delineate the conditions underlying a more systematic mode of reasoning based on deliberate, rule-based inductive reasoning (e.g., Fong, Krantz & Nisbett, 1986). Specifically, it is assumed that inductive reasoning is based on two different information-processing modes, a heuristic and a systematic mode. These modes are instances of two broadly defined cognitive systems, the associative system and the rule-based system (Sloman,1996). Heuristic reasoning is largely automatic, based on associative principles of similarity and temporal contiguity; it is effortless, and often unintentional. Systematic reasoning is rule-based; it is effortful and intentional. It is further claimed that the two reasoning modes provide independent contributions to judgment under uncertainty. Accordingly, it is hypothesized that variables traditionally associated with controlled processing should produce process dissociations by affecting systematic reasoning while leaving heuristic reasoning largely invariant. However, variables traditionally associated with automatic processing should produce the inverse kind of dissociation (i.e., affect heuristic reasoning but leave systematic reasoning largely unchanged). (...) |
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| Autores principais: | Ferreira, Mário B. |
| Assunto: | Julgamento Raciocínio Heurística Automaticidade Teses de doutoramento - 2004 |
| Ano: | 2003 |
| País: | Portugal |
| Tipo de documento: | tese de doutoramento |
| Tipo de acesso: | acesso restrito |
| Instituição associada: | Universidade de Lisboa |
| Idioma: | inglês |
| Origem: | Repositório da Universidade de Lisboa |
| Resumo: | I present a dual-process approach to judgment under uncertainty that is capable of retaining the explanatory power of the heuristics and biases research program (e.g., Tversky, Slovic, & Khaneman, 1982) but also able to delineate the conditions underlying a more systematic mode of reasoning based on deliberate, rule-based inductive reasoning (e.g., Fong, Krantz & Nisbett, 1986). Specifically, it is assumed that inductive reasoning is based on two different information-processing modes, a heuristic and a systematic mode. These modes are instances of two broadly defined cognitive systems, the associative system and the rule-based system (Sloman,1996). Heuristic reasoning is largely automatic, based on associative principles of similarity and temporal contiguity; it is effortless, and often unintentional. Systematic reasoning is rule-based; it is effortful and intentional. It is further claimed that the two reasoning modes provide independent contributions to judgment under uncertainty. Accordingly, it is hypothesized that variables traditionally associated with controlled processing should produce process dissociations by affecting systematic reasoning while leaving heuristic reasoning largely invariant. However, variables traditionally associated with automatic processing should produce the inverse kind of dissociation (i.e., affect heuristic reasoning but leave systematic reasoning largely unchanged). (...) |
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