Publicação
The development of higher education in Europe as a 'coordination game'
| Resumo: | This paper tries to explain differences in high education growth across European countries by using a coordination game (Stag Hunt) played by n candidates to college education. The payoff of enrolling in the university is positive only if there is "una nimity", i.e. if all candidates engage in higher education, being zero otherwise. This coordination requirement follows from the specialized nature of skills acquired through higher education, which can only be made profitable if each graduate is matched with graduate complementary specialists. This game has two strict Nash equilibria, where either all youngsters enter the university or none does. We show that the assessment of the factors that explain the differential growth of universities across countries is related with alternative ways of selecting a Nash equilibrium in the coordination game. By using empirical data, we can conclude that demographic trends and a cumulative causation factor play a major role in tertiary education growth, while the "wage premium" asso- ciated with college attendance also matters but is relatively secondary. "Tuition fees" and other direct financial costs do not appear to be a significant cause or hindrance of university development. |
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| Autores principais: | Pontes, Jose Pedro |
| Outros Autores: | Buhse, Ana Paula |
| Assunto: | Higher Education Regional Development Coordination Games Risk Dominance |
| Ano: | 2019 |
| País: | Portugal |
| Tipo de documento: | working paper |
| Tipo de acesso: | acesso aberto |
| Instituição associada: | Universidade de Lisboa |
| Idioma: | inglês |
| Origem: | Repositório da Universidade de Lisboa |
| Resumo: | This paper tries to explain differences in high education growth across European countries by using a coordination game (Stag Hunt) played by n candidates to college education. The payoff of enrolling in the university is positive only if there is "una nimity", i.e. if all candidates engage in higher education, being zero otherwise. This coordination requirement follows from the specialized nature of skills acquired through higher education, which can only be made profitable if each graduate is matched with graduate complementary specialists. This game has two strict Nash equilibria, where either all youngsters enter the university or none does. We show that the assessment of the factors that explain the differential growth of universities across countries is related with alternative ways of selecting a Nash equilibrium in the coordination game. By using empirical data, we can conclude that demographic trends and a cumulative causation factor play a major role in tertiary education growth, while the "wage premium" asso- ciated with college attendance also matters but is relatively secondary. "Tuition fees" and other direct financial costs do not appear to be a significant cause or hindrance of university development. |
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