Publicação
The effects of official and unofficial information on tax compliance
| Resumo: | The administration of tax policy has shifted its focus from enforcement to complementary instruments aimed at creating a social norm of tax compliance. In this paper we provide an analysis of the effects of the dissemination of information regarding the past degree of tax evasion at the social level on the current individual tax compliance behavior. We build an experiment where, for given levels of audit probabilities, fines and tax rates, subjects have to declare their income after receiving either a communication of the official average tax evasion rate or a private message from a group of randomly matched peers about their tax behavior. We use the experimental data to estimate a dynamic econometric model of tax evasion. The econometric model extends the Allingham – Sandmo - Yitzhaki tax evasion model to include self-consistency and endogenous social interactions among taxpayers. We find four main results. First, tax compliance is very persistent. Second, the higher the official past tax evasion rate the higher the degree of persistence: evaders are more likely to evade again, and compliant individuals are more likely to comply again. Third, when all peers communicate to have evaded (complied) in the past, both evaders and compliant individuals are more likely to evade (comply). Fourth, while both treatments,and especially the unofficial information treatment, are associated, in the context of our experiment, with a significantly larger growth in evasion intensity, the aggregate effect |
|---|---|
| Autores principais: | Garcia, Filomena |
| Outros Autores: | Opromolla, Luca David; Vezzulli, Andrea; Marques, Rafael |
| Assunto: | Tax Morale Experiment Peer Effects. Information Tax Evasion Experiment Peer Effects |
| Ano: | 2018 |
| País: | Portugal |
| Tipo de documento: | working paper |
| Tipo de acesso: | acesso aberto |
| Instituição associada: | Universidade de Lisboa |
| Idioma: | inglês |
| Origem: | Repositório da Universidade de Lisboa |
| _version_ | 1865920797196943360 |
|---|---|
| author | Garcia, Filomena |
| author2 | Opromolla, Luca David Vezzulli, Andrea Marques, Rafael |
| author2_role | author author author |
| author_facet | Garcia, Filomena Garcia, Filomena Opromolla, Luca David Vezzulli, Andrea Marques, Rafael Opromolla, Luca David Vezzulli, Andrea Marques, Rafael |
| author_role | author |
| contributor_name_str_mv | Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto da ULisboa |
| country_str | PT |
| creators_json_str | [{\"Person.name\":\"Garcia, Filomena\"},{\"Person.name\":\"Opromolla, Luca David\"},{\"Person.name\":\"Vezzulli, Andrea\"},{\"Person.name\":\"Marques, Rafael\"}] |
| datacite.contributors.contributor.contributorName.fl_str_mv | Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto da ULisboa |
| datacite.creators.creator.creatorName.fl_str_mv | Garcia, Filomena Opromolla, Luca David Vezzulli, Andrea Marques, Rafael |
| datacite.date.Accepted.fl_str_mv | 2018-04-01T00:00:00Z |
| datacite.date.available.fl_str_mv | 2022-03-29T13:27:31Z |
| datacite.date.embargoed.fl_str_mv | 2022-03-29T13:27:31Z |
| datacite.rights.fl_str_mv | http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 |
| datacite.subjects.subject.fl_str_mv | Tax Morale Experiment Peer Effects. Information Tax Evasion Experiment Peer Effects |
| datacite.titles.title.fl_str_mv | The effects of official and unofficial information on tax compliance |
| dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv | Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto da ULisboa |
| dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv | Garcia, Filomena Opromolla, Luca David Vezzulli, Andrea Marques, Rafael |
| dc.date.Accepted.fl_str_mv | 2018-04-01T00:00:00Z |
| dc.date.available.fl_str_mv | 2022-03-29T13:27:31Z |
| dc.date.embargoed.fl_str_mv | 2022-03-29T13:27:31Z |
| dc.format.none.fl_str_mv | application/pdf |
| dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv | http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/23946 |
| dc.language.none.fl_str_mv | eng |
| dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv | Banco de Portugal |
| dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv | http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 |
| dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv | Tax Morale Experiment Peer Effects. Information Tax Evasion Experiment Peer Effects |
| dc.title.fl_str_mv | The effects of official and unofficial information on tax compliance |
| dc.type.none.fl_str_mv | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042 |
| description | The administration of tax policy has shifted its focus from enforcement to complementary instruments aimed at creating a social norm of tax compliance. In this paper we provide an analysis of the effects of the dissemination of information regarding the past degree of tax evasion at the social level on the current individual tax compliance behavior. We build an experiment where, for given levels of audit probabilities, fines and tax rates, subjects have to declare their income after receiving either a communication of the official average tax evasion rate or a private message from a group of randomly matched peers about their tax behavior. We use the experimental data to estimate a dynamic econometric model of tax evasion. The econometric model extends the Allingham – Sandmo - Yitzhaki tax evasion model to include self-consistency and endogenous social interactions among taxpayers. We find four main results. First, tax compliance is very persistent. Second, the higher the official past tax evasion rate the higher the degree of persistence: evaders are more likely to evade again, and compliant individuals are more likely to comply again. Third, when all peers communicate to have evaded (complied) in the past, both evaders and compliant individuals are more likely to evade (comply). Fourth, while both treatments,and especially the unofficial information treatment, are associated, in the context of our experiment, with a significantly larger growth in evasion intensity, the aggregate effect |
| dirty | 0 |
| eu_rights_str_mv | openAccess |
| format | workingPaper |
| fulltext.url.fl_str_mv | https://repositorio.ulisboa.pt/bitstreams/22054a02-dda6-4dba-86f1-d7f2b07745dd/download |
| id | ul_5d9de2000a1f0ea0f7eeebe4c0a5e1ec |
| identifier.url.fl_str_mv | http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/23946 |
| instacron_str | ul |
| institution | Universidade de Lisboa |
| instname_str | Universidade de Lisboa |
| language | eng |
| network_acronym_str | ul |
| network_name_str | Repositório da Universidade de Lisboa |
| oai_identifier_str | oai:repositorio.ulisboa.pt:10400.5/23946 |
| organization_str_mv | urn:organizationAcronym:ul |
| person_str_mv | Garcia, Filomena Opromolla, Luca David Vezzulli, Andrea Marques, Rafael |
| publishDate | 2018 |
| publisher.none.fl_str_mv | Banco de Portugal |
| reponame_str | Repositório da Universidade de Lisboa |
| repository_id_str | urn:repositoryAcronym:ul |
| service_str_mv | urn:repositoryAcronym:ul |
| spelling | engBanco de Portugalpt_PTThe administration of tax policy has shifted its focus from enforcement to complementary instruments aimed at creating a social norm of tax compliance. In this paper we provide an analysis of the effects of the dissemination of information regarding the past degree of tax evasion at the social level on the current individual tax compliance behavior. We build an experiment where, for given levels of audit probabilities, fines and tax rates, subjects have to declare their income after receiving either a communication of the official average tax evasion rate or a private message from a group of randomly matched peers about their tax behavior. We use the experimental data to estimate a dynamic econometric model of tax evasion. The econometric model extends the Allingham – Sandmo - Yitzhaki tax evasion model to include self-consistency and endogenous social interactions among taxpayers. We find four main results. First, tax compliance is very persistent. Second, the higher the official past tax evasion rate the higher the degree of persistence: evaders are more likely to evade again, and compliant individuals are more likely to comply again. Third, when all peers communicate to have evaded (complied) in the past, both evaders and compliant individuals are more likely to evade (comply). Fourth, while both treatments,and especially the unofficial information treatment, are associated, in the context of our experiment, with a significantly larger growth in evasion intensity, the aggregate effectapplication/pdfpt_PTThe effects of official and unofficial information on tax complianceGarcia, FilomenaOpromolla, Luca DavidVezzulli, AndreaMarques, RafaelHostingInstitutionOrganizationalRepositório Científico de Acesso Aberto da ULisboae-mailmailto:repositorio@reitoria.ulisboa.ptrepositorio@reitoria.ulisboa.ptISSNIsPartOf2182-04222022-03-29T13:27:31Z2018-042018-04-01T00:00:00ZHandlehttp://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/23946http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2open accessTax Morale Experiment Peer Effects.InformationTax EvasionExperiment Peer Effects4903672 bytesother research producthttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042working paperhttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2application/pdffulltexthttps://repositorio.ulisboa.pt/bitstreams/22054a02-dda6-4dba-86f1-d7f2b07745dd/download |
| spellingShingle | The effects of official and unofficial information on tax compliance The effects of official and unofficial information on tax compliance Garcia, Filomena Tax Morale Experiment Peer Effects. Information Tax Evasion Experiment Peer Effects Garcia, Filomena Tax Morale Experiment Peer Effects. Information Tax Evasion Experiment Peer Effects |
| status | SINGLETON |
| subject.fl_str_mv | Tax Morale Experiment Peer Effects. Information Tax Evasion Experiment Peer Effects |
| title | The effects of official and unofficial information on tax compliance |
| title_full | The effects of official and unofficial information on tax compliance |
| title_fullStr | The effects of official and unofficial information on tax compliance The effects of official and unofficial information on tax compliance |
| title_full_unstemmed | The effects of official and unofficial information on tax compliance The effects of official and unofficial information on tax compliance |
| title_short | The effects of official and unofficial information on tax compliance |
| title_sort | The effects of official and unofficial information on tax compliance |
| topic | Tax Morale Experiment Peer Effects. Information Tax Evasion Experiment Peer Effects |
| topic_facet | Tax Morale Experiment Peer Effects. Information Tax Evasion Experiment Peer Effects |
| url | http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/23946 |
| visible | 1 |