Publicação

On the Resilience of Intrusion-Tolerant Distributed Systems

Ver documento

Detalhes bibliográficos
Resumo:The paper starts by introducing a new dimension along which distributed systems resilience may be evaluated - exhaustion-safety. A node-exhaustion-safe intrusion-tolerant distributed system is a system that assuredly does not suffer more than the assumed number of node failures (e.g., crash, Byzantine). We show that it is not possible to build this kind of systems under the asynchronous model. This result follows from the fact that in an asynchronous environment one cannot guarantee that the system terminates its execution before the occurrence of more than the assumed number of faults. After introducing exhaustion-safety, the paper proposes a new paradigm - proactive resilience - to build intrusion-tolerant distributed systems. Proactive resilience is based on architectural hybridization and hybrid distributed system modeling. The Proactive Resilience Model (PRM) is presented and shown to be a way of building node-exhaustion-safe intrusion-tolerant systems. Finally, the paper describes the design of a secret sharing system built according to the PRM. A proof-of-concept prototype of this system is shown to be highly resilient under different attack scenarios.
Autores principais:Neves, Nuno Ferreira
Outros Autores:Veríssimo, Paulo; Sousa, Paulo; Lopes, Antónia
Assunto:Intrusion Tolerance Timing Assumptions Proactive Recovery Wormholes Secret Sharing
Ano:2006
País:Portugal
Tipo de documento:relatório
Tipo de acesso:acesso aberto
Instituição associada:Universidade de Lisboa
Idioma:português
Origem:Repositório da Universidade de Lisboa

Registos relacionados

Registos relacionados