Publicação
Reflective Knowledge and the Nature of Truth
| Resumo: | I consider the problem of reflective knowledge faced by views that treat sensitivity as a sufficient condition for knowledge, or as a major ingredient of the concept, as in the analysis I advance in Scepticism and Reliable Belief. I present the problem as concerning the correct analysis of SATs — beliefs to the effect that one of my current beliefs is true. I suggest that a plausible analysis of SATs should treat them as neither true nor false when they ascribe truth to a non-existent belief. I argue that the problem is inescapable if we construe SATs as ascribing the property of truth to a belief. Deflationism manages to avoid the problem of reflective knowledge, but it does so by violating alethic priority — the principle that our account of representation must be built on our account of truth. I argue that we can avoid the problem of reflective knowledge while preserving alethic priority with a pragmatist account of truth — according to which truth is explicated in terms of the rules that govern the practice of assessing judgments and related items as true or false. |
|---|---|
| Autores principais: | Zalabardo, José L. |
| Assunto: | Reflective knowledge Truth Pragmatism Meaning Sensitivity |
| Ano: | 2016 |
| País: | Portugal |
| Tipo de documento: | artigo |
| Tipo de acesso: | acesso aberto |
| Instituição associada: | Universidade de Lisboa |
| Idioma: | inglês |
| Origem: | Repositório da Universidade de Lisboa |
| _version_ | 1866811475954237440 |
|---|---|
| author | Zalabardo, José L. |
| author_facet | Zalabardo, José L. |
| author_role | author |
| contributor_name_str_mv | Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto da ULisboa |
| country_str | PT |
| creators_json_txt | [{\"Person.name\":\"Zalabardo, José L.\"}] |
| datacite.contributors.contributor.contributorName.fl_str_mv | Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto da ULisboa |
| datacite.creators.creator.creatorName.fl_str_mv | Zalabardo, José L. |
| datacite.date.Accepted.fl_str_mv | 2016-11-01T00:00:00Z |
| datacite.date.available.fl_str_mv | 2017-01-16T10:40:42Z |
| datacite.date.embargoed.fl_str_mv | 2017-01-16T10:40:42Z |
| datacite.rights.fl_str_mv | http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 |
| datacite.subjects.subject.fl_str_mv | Reflective knowledge Truth Pragmatism Meaning Sensitivity |
| datacite.titles.title.fl_str_mv | Reflective Knowledge and the Nature of Truth |
| dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv | Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto da ULisboa |
| dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv | Zalabardo, José L. |
| dc.date.Accepted.fl_str_mv | 2016-11-01T00:00:00Z |
| dc.date.available.fl_str_mv | 2017-01-16T10:40:42Z |
| dc.date.embargoed.fl_str_mv | 2017-01-16T10:40:42Z |
| dc.format.none.fl_str_mv | application/pdf |
| dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv | http://hdl.handle.net/10451/25905 |
| dc.language.none.fl_str_mv | eng |
| dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv | Universidade de Lisboa, Faculdade de Letras, Centro de Filosofia |
| dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv | http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 |
| dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv | Reflective knowledge Truth Pragmatism Meaning Sensitivity |
| dc.title.fl_str_mv | Reflective Knowledge and the Nature of Truth |
| dc.type.none.fl_str_mv | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 |
| description | I consider the problem of reflective knowledge faced by views that treat sensitivity as a sufficient condition for knowledge, or as a major ingredient of the concept, as in the analysis I advance in Scepticism and Reliable Belief. I present the problem as concerning the correct analysis of SATs — beliefs to the effect that one of my current beliefs is true. I suggest that a plausible analysis of SATs should treat them as neither true nor false when they ascribe truth to a non-existent belief. I argue that the problem is inescapable if we construe SATs as ascribing the property of truth to a belief. Deflationism manages to avoid the problem of reflective knowledge, but it does so by violating alethic priority — the principle that our account of representation must be built on our account of truth. I argue that we can avoid the problem of reflective knowledge while preserving alethic priority with a pragmatist account of truth — according to which truth is explicated in terms of the rules that govern the practice of assessing judgments and related items as true or false. |
| dirty | 0 |
| eu_rights_str_mv | openAccess |
| format | article |
| fulltext.url.fl_str_mv | https://repositorio.ulisboa.pt/bitstreams/3e79663c-2bce-4092-bee1-b32e6e46c62c/download |
| id | ul_c658aebd3ab13d7d898ecd62bb7bdfee |
| identifier.url.fl_str_mv | http://hdl.handle.net/10451/25905 |
| instacron_str | ul |
| institution | Universidade de Lisboa |
| instname_str | Universidade de Lisboa |
| language | eng |
| network_acronym_str | ul |
| network_name_str | Repositório da Universidade de Lisboa |
| oai_identifier_str | oai:repositorio.ulisboa.pt:10451/25905 |
| organization_str_mv | urn:organizationAcronym:ul |
| person_str_mv | Zalabardo, José L. |
| publishDate | 2016 |
| publisher.none.fl_str_mv | Universidade de Lisboa, Faculdade de Letras, Centro de Filosofia |
| reponame_str | Repositório da Universidade de Lisboa |
| repository_id_str | urn:repositoryAcronym:ul |
| service_str_mv | urn:repositoryAcronym:ul |
| spelling | engUniversidade de Lisboa, Faculdade de Letras, Centro de Filosofiapt_PTI consider the problem of reflective knowledge faced by views that treat sensitivity as a sufficient condition for knowledge, or as a major ingredient of the concept, as in the analysis I advance in Scepticism and Reliable Belief. I present the problem as concerning the correct analysis of SATs — beliefs to the effect that one of my current beliefs is true. I suggest that a plausible analysis of SATs should treat them as neither true nor false when they ascribe truth to a non-existent belief. I argue that the problem is inescapable if we construe SATs as ascribing the property of truth to a belief. Deflationism manages to avoid the problem of reflective knowledge, but it does so by violating alethic priority — the principle that our account of representation must be built on our account of truth. I argue that we can avoid the problem of reflective knowledge while preserving alethic priority with a pragmatist account of truth — according to which truth is explicated in terms of the rules that govern the practice of assessing judgments and related items as true or false.application/pdfpt_PTReflective Knowledge and the Nature of TruthZalabardo, José L.HostingInstitutionOrganizationalRepositório Científico de Acesso Aberto da ULisboae-mailmailto:repositorio@reitoria.ulisboa.ptrepositorio@reitoria.ulisboa.pt2017-01-16T10:40:42Z2016-112016-11-01T00:00:00ZHandlehttp://hdl.handle.net/10451/25905http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2open accessReflective knowledgeTruthPragmatismMeaningSensitivity236394 bytesliteraturehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501journal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2application/pdffulltexthttps://repositorio.ulisboa.pt/bitstreams/3e79663c-2bce-4092-bee1-b32e6e46c62c/downloadDisputatioVol. VIII, nº 43147171 |
| spellingShingle | Reflective Knowledge and the Nature of Truth Zalabardo, José L. Reflective knowledge Truth Pragmatism Meaning Sensitivity |
| status | SINGLETON |
| subject.fl_str_mv | Reflective knowledge Truth Pragmatism Meaning Sensitivity |
| title | Reflective Knowledge and the Nature of Truth |
| title_full | Reflective Knowledge and the Nature of Truth |
| title_fullStr | Reflective Knowledge and the Nature of Truth |
| title_full_unstemmed | Reflective Knowledge and the Nature of Truth |
| title_short | Reflective Knowledge and the Nature of Truth |
| title_sort | Reflective Knowledge and the Nature of Truth |
| topic | Reflective knowledge Truth Pragmatism Meaning Sensitivity |
| topic_facet | Reflective knowledge Truth Pragmatism Meaning Sensitivity |
| url | http://hdl.handle.net/10451/25905 |
| visible | 1 |