Publicação
Italian coalitions and electoral promises: assessing the democratic performance of the Prodi I and Berlusconi II governments
| Resumo: | Italian party coalitions (from both the centre-left and the centre-right) have enacted an average of 57% of the pledges included in their common manifestos. In relative terms, Italian political parties keep their electoral promises much less than parties governing in single-party government, but slightly outperform those that form post-electoral coalitions. Although this finding contradicts the widespread pessimism about Italy's performance, it also illustrates that there is no significant advantage to bipolarism and the existence of a common programme as opposed to situations where coalitions are formed after the elections. This might explain Italians' dissatisfaction with the way democracy works in their country. |
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| Autores principais: | Moury, C. |
| Assunto: | Coalition governance Electoral pledges Institutions Italian political parties |
| Ano: | 2011 |
| País: | Portugal |
| Tipo de documento: | artigo |
| Tipo de acesso: | acesso embargado |
| Instituição associada: | ISCTE |
| Idioma: | inglês |
| Origem: | Repositório ISCTE |
| Resumo: | Italian party coalitions (from both the centre-left and the centre-right) have enacted an average of 57% of the pledges included in their common manifestos. In relative terms, Italian political parties keep their electoral promises much less than parties governing in single-party government, but slightly outperform those that form post-electoral coalitions. Although this finding contradicts the widespread pessimism about Italy's performance, it also illustrates that there is no significant advantage to bipolarism and the existence of a common programme as opposed to situations where coalitions are formed after the elections. This might explain Italians' dissatisfaction with the way democracy works in their country. |
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