Publicação
How are southeast asian small countries coping with the rise of China? The case of Vietnam
| Resumo: | Over the past two decades, Southeast Asia (SEA) region has witnessed considerable security threats such as armed rivalries of both inter-and intra-state kinds as well as non-traditional threats including terrorism. Even though none of them has led to a large-scale destabilization of the whole region, SEA is nevertheless facing perennially the threat of military conflict. The actors of such potential military conflict would be the ones currently engaged into the territorial disputes over the South China Sea (SCS): China on the one hand and states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) on the other hand. The contested territories, such as the Paracel and Spratly Islands, including the vast surrounding water areas where sea lanes of communication (SLOCs) pass, have become an object of not only territorial, but also economic and strategic competition. The SCS disputes might thus upset the current status quo that emerged in the aftermath of the Cold War. China, the rising power in Asia, should be regarded both as a benign power as well as security threat for peace and stability in the region. Chinese soft power assumes a growingly important role in Chinese foreign policy, in connection with the aspiration to promote a benign image of the China rise. However, the study argues that China’s overarching strategy towards SEA has been a careful mix of soft and hard postures. It notes that a growing asymmetry of naval power to the advantage of China is causing concern both among SEA states and external major players with interests in the region. Against this backdrop, the present dissertation explores how SEA states have sought to mitigate the increasingly unequal power distribution in the SCS, while focusing on Vietnam as its case study. SEA states tend to cope with China not by deploying balancing strategies - either by aligning with the US, or reinforcing ASEAN exclusively, but rather hedging strategies: SEA states do not want to choose between either China or US. While adopting an analytical approach founded on a dialogue with the existing academic literature, this study presents empirical evidence which corroborates the hedging dynamics in the region. At the same time, the contribution goes a step further by arguing that the SEA states have adopted a particular type of hedging. The latter consisted in actively seeking the engagement of such external major players as the US, India, Japan, Russia, and the EU, in the existing regional fora, namely the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and East Asia Summit. |
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| Autores principais: | Tran, Phuc Thi |
| Assunto: | China ASEAN Vietnam US Japan India EU Russia Vietname EUA Japão Índia UE Rússia |
| Ano: | 2012 |
| País: | Portugal |
| Tipo de documento: | dissertação de mestrado |
| Tipo de acesso: | acesso restrito |
| Instituição associada: | Universidade do Minho |
| Idioma: | português |
| Origem: | RepositóriUM - Universidade do Minho |
| Resumo: | Over the past two decades, Southeast Asia (SEA) region has witnessed considerable security threats such as armed rivalries of both inter-and intra-state kinds as well as non-traditional threats including terrorism. Even though none of them has led to a large-scale destabilization of the whole region, SEA is nevertheless facing perennially the threat of military conflict. The actors of such potential military conflict would be the ones currently engaged into the territorial disputes over the South China Sea (SCS): China on the one hand and states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) on the other hand. The contested territories, such as the Paracel and Spratly Islands, including the vast surrounding water areas where sea lanes of communication (SLOCs) pass, have become an object of not only territorial, but also economic and strategic competition. The SCS disputes might thus upset the current status quo that emerged in the aftermath of the Cold War. China, the rising power in Asia, should be regarded both as a benign power as well as security threat for peace and stability in the region. Chinese soft power assumes a growingly important role in Chinese foreign policy, in connection with the aspiration to promote a benign image of the China rise. However, the study argues that China’s overarching strategy towards SEA has been a careful mix of soft and hard postures. It notes that a growing asymmetry of naval power to the advantage of China is causing concern both among SEA states and external major players with interests in the region. Against this backdrop, the present dissertation explores how SEA states have sought to mitigate the increasingly unequal power distribution in the SCS, while focusing on Vietnam as its case study. SEA states tend to cope with China not by deploying balancing strategies - either by aligning with the US, or reinforcing ASEAN exclusively, but rather hedging strategies: SEA states do not want to choose between either China or US. While adopting an analytical approach founded on a dialogue with the existing academic literature, this study presents empirical evidence which corroborates the hedging dynamics in the region. At the same time, the contribution goes a step further by arguing that the SEA states have adopted a particular type of hedging. The latter consisted in actively seeking the engagement of such external major players as the US, India, Japan, Russia, and the EU, in the existing regional fora, namely the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and East Asia Summit. |
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