Publicação

Individual memory and the emergence of cooperation

Detalhes bibliográficos
Resumo:	The social brain hypothesis states that selection pressures associated with complex social relationships have driven the evolution of sophisticated cognitive processes in primates. We investigated how the size of cooperative primate communities depends on the memory of each of its members and on the pressure exerted by natural selection. To this end we devised an evolutionary game theoretical model in which social interactions are modelled in terms of a repeated Prisoner's Dilemma played by individuals who may exhibit a different memory capacity. Here, memory is greatly simplified and mapped onto a single parameter m describing the number of conspecifics whose previous action each individual can remember. We show that increasing m enables cooperation to emerge and be maintained in groups of increasing sizes. Furthermore, harsher social dilemmas lead to the need for a higher m in order to ensure high levels of cooperation. Finally, we show how the interplay between the dilemma individuals face and their memory capacity m allows us to define a critical group size below which cooperation may thrive, and how this value depends sensitively on the strength of natural selection.
Autores principais:	Moreira, João
Outros Autores:	Vukov, Jeromos; Sousa, Claudia Maria A. Margato Ramalho; Santos, Francisco C.; D'Almeida, André F.; Santos, Marta D.; Pacheco, Jorge M.
Assunto:	Cooperation Evolutionary game theory Memory Reciprocity Ecology, Evolution, Behavior and Systematics Animal Science and Zoology
Ano:	2013
País:	Portugal
Tipo de documento:	artigo
Tipo de acesso:	acesso aberto
Instituição associada:	Universidade Nova de Lisboa
Idioma:	inglês
Origem:	Repositório Institucional da UNL

Descrição
Resumo:	The social brain hypothesis states that selection pressures associated with complex social relationships have driven the evolution of sophisticated cognitive processes in primates. We investigated how the size of cooperative primate communities depends on the memory of each of its members and on the pressure exerted by natural selection. To this end we devised an evolutionary game theoretical model in which social interactions are modelled in terms of a repeated Prisoner's Dilemma played by individuals who may exhibit a different memory capacity. Here, memory is greatly simplified and mapped onto a single parameter m describing the number of conspecifics whose previous action each individual can remember. We show that increasing m enables cooperation to emerge and be maintained in groups of increasing sizes. Furthermore, harsher social dilemmas lead to the need for a higher m in order to ensure high levels of cooperation. Finally, we show how the interplay between the dilemma individuals face and their memory capacity m allows us to define a critical group size below which cooperation may thrive, and how this value depends sensitively on the strength of natural selection.