Publicação

Fiber investment and access under uncertainty

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Detalhes bibliográficos
Resumo:Regulated access schemes shape incentives for both investment and entry in next-generation networks. We study in a general duopoly setting whether and how risk premia, access options or long-term contracts improve those incentives as compared to standard access pricing. The first two do so: Risk premia guarantee highest coverage, while distorting retail pricing. Access options safeguard undistorted retail competition, but are not effective in the most costly areas. On the other hand, long-term contracts have little scope to increase coverage because they intensify retail competition.
Autores principais:Bourreau, Marc
Outros Autores:Cambini, Carlo; Hoernig, Steffen; Vogelsang, Ingo
Assunto:Access options Long-term contracts Next generation networks Risk premium Uncertainty Economics and Econometrics
Ano:2020
País:Portugal
Tipo de documento:artigo
Tipo de acesso:acesso aberto
Instituição associada:Universidade Nova de Lisboa
Idioma:inglês
Origem:Repositório Institucional da UNL
Descrição
Resumo:Regulated access schemes shape incentives for both investment and entry in next-generation networks. We study in a general duopoly setting whether and how risk premia, access options or long-term contracts improve those incentives as compared to standard access pricing. The first two do so: Risk premia guarantee highest coverage, while distorting retail pricing. Access options safeguard undistorted retail competition, but are not effective in the most costly areas. On the other hand, long-term contracts have little scope to increase coverage because they intensify retail competition.