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Fiber investment and access under uncertainty

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Bibliographic Details
Summary:Regulated access schemes shape incentives for both investment and entry in next-generation networks. We study in a general duopoly setting whether and how risk premia, access options or long-term contracts improve those incentives as compared to standard access pricing. The first two do so: Risk premia guarantee highest coverage, while distorting retail pricing. Access options safeguard undistorted retail competition, but are not effective in the most costly areas. On the other hand, long-term contracts have little scope to increase coverage because they intensify retail competition.
Main Authors:Bourreau, Marc
Other Authors:Cambini, Carlo; Hoernig, Steffen; Vogelsang, Ingo
Subject:Access options Long-term contracts Next generation networks Risk premium Uncertainty Economics and Econometrics
Year:2020
Country:Portugal
Document type:article
Access type:open access
Associated institution:Universidade Nova de Lisboa
Language:English
Origin:Repositório Institucional da UNL
Description
Summary:Regulated access schemes shape incentives for both investment and entry in next-generation networks. We study in a general duopoly setting whether and how risk premia, access options or long-term contracts improve those incentives as compared to standard access pricing. The first two do so: Risk premia guarantee highest coverage, while distorting retail pricing. Access options safeguard undistorted retail competition, but are not effective in the most costly areas. On the other hand, long-term contracts have little scope to increase coverage because they intensify retail competition.