Publicação
Towards a full banking union in Europe: Waiting for the next crisis?
| Resumo: | This chapter assesses the need for a complete European Banking Union (EBU) given the perceived shortcomings of Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), especially the negative banking-sovereign linkages highlighted by the Eurozone crisis. If properly implemented, a complete EBU severs these linkages and strengthens the resilience of Europe’s banking sector. The design of an optimal EBU comprises three components: European Deposit Insurance System (EDIS), Banking Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) and European Stability Mechanism (ESM), which could evolve to a European Monetary Fund (EMF). While such a design encompasses both risk-reduction and risk-sharing features, the former has been favored due to mostly political considerations. Indeed, completing EBU will require significant political will to adopt additional risk-sharing measures, such as a common fiscal backstop and a truly supranational EDIS, amongst others. |
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| Autores principais: | Brites Pereira, Luís |
| Outros Autores: | Rocha de Sousa, Miguel |
| Assunto: | Bank-Sovereign Linkages European Banking Union Eurozone crisis |
| Ano: | 2019 |
| País: | Portugal |
| Tipo de documento: | capítulo de livro |
| Tipo de acesso: | acesso restrito |
| Instituição associada: | Universidade de Évora |
| Idioma: | português |
| Origem: | Repositório Científico da Universidade de Évora |
| Resumo: | This chapter assesses the need for a complete European Banking Union (EBU) given the perceived shortcomings of Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), especially the negative banking-sovereign linkages highlighted by the Eurozone crisis. If properly implemented, a complete EBU severs these linkages and strengthens the resilience of Europe’s banking sector. The design of an optimal EBU comprises three components: European Deposit Insurance System (EDIS), Banking Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) and European Stability Mechanism (ESM), which could evolve to a European Monetary Fund (EMF). While such a design encompasses both risk-reduction and risk-sharing features, the former has been favored due to mostly political considerations. Indeed, completing EBU will require significant political will to adopt additional risk-sharing measures, such as a common fiscal backstop and a truly supranational EDIS, amongst others. |
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