Publicação
Random matching in the college admissions problem
| Resumo: | In the college admissions problem, we consider the incentives confronting agents who face the prospect of being matched by a random stable mechanism. We provide a fairly complete characterization of ordinal equilibria. Namely, every ordinal equilibrium yields a degenerate probability distribution. Furthermore, individual rationality is a necessary and sufficient condition for an equilibrium outcome, while stability is guaranteed in ordinal equilibria where firms act straightforwardly. Finally, we relate equilibrium behavior in random and in deterministic mechanisms. |
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| Autores principais: | Pais, Joana |
| Assunto: | Matching College Admissions Problem Stability Random Mechanism |
| Ano: | 2008 |
| País: | Portugal |
| Tipo de documento: | artigo |
| Tipo de acesso: | acesso aberto |
| Instituição associada: | Universidade de Lisboa |
| Idioma: | inglês |
| Origem: | Repositório da Universidade de Lisboa |
| Resumo: | In the college admissions problem, we consider the incentives confronting agents who face the prospect of being matched by a random stable mechanism. We provide a fairly complete characterization of ordinal equilibria. Namely, every ordinal equilibrium yields a degenerate probability distribution. Furthermore, individual rationality is a necessary and sufficient condition for an equilibrium outcome, while stability is guaranteed in ordinal equilibria where firms act straightforwardly. Finally, we relate equilibrium behavior in random and in deterministic mechanisms. |
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