Publicação
Randomized intrusion-tolerant asynchronous services
| Resumo: | Randomized agreement protocols have been around for more than two decades. Often assumed to be inefficient due to their high expected communication and time complexities, they have remained largely overlooked by the community-at-large as a valid solution for the deployment of faulttolerant distributed systems. This thesis aims to demonstrate that randomization can be a very competitive approach even in hostile environments where arbitrary faults can occur. The implementation of a stack of randomized intrusion-tolerant protocols is described, and its performance evaluated under different faultloads. The stack provides a set of relevant services ranging frombasic communication primitives up to atomic broadcast. The protocols share a set of important structural properties, namely they tolerate arbitrary faults, have an optimal resilience, are time-free, completely decentralized, and signature-free. The experimental evaluation shows that the protocols are efficient and no performance reduction is observed under certain Byzantine faults. |
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| Autores principais: | Moniz, Henrique Lícias Senra |
| Assunto: | Intrusion tolerance Byzantine agreement Randomized algorithms Performance evaluation Teses de mestrado - 2006 |
| Ano: | 2006 |
| País: | Portugal |
| Tipo de documento: | dissertação de mestrado |
| Tipo de acesso: | acesso restrito |
| Instituição associada: | Universidade de Lisboa |
| Idioma: | inglês |
| Origem: | Repositório da Universidade de Lisboa |
| Resumo: | Randomized agreement protocols have been around for more than two decades. Often assumed to be inefficient due to their high expected communication and time complexities, they have remained largely overlooked by the community-at-large as a valid solution for the deployment of faulttolerant distributed systems. This thesis aims to demonstrate that randomization can be a very competitive approach even in hostile environments where arbitrary faults can occur. The implementation of a stack of randomized intrusion-tolerant protocols is described, and its performance evaluated under different faultloads. The stack provides a set of relevant services ranging frombasic communication primitives up to atomic broadcast. The protocols share a set of important structural properties, namely they tolerate arbitrary faults, have an optimal resilience, are time-free, completely decentralized, and signature-free. The experimental evaluation shows that the protocols are efficient and no performance reduction is observed under certain Byzantine faults. |
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