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Citizensʼ freedom to choose representatives : ballot structure, proportionality and 'fragmented' parliaments

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Resumo:Analysis of the political consequences of electoral laws has emphasized how individual characteristics of the electoral system (electoral formulas, district magnitude, ballot structure) affect the degree of parliament ‘‘fragmentation’’ and proportionality. This paper argues that the personal attributes of representatives are also an important consequence of electoral laws, and that they are in part determined by citizens’ freedom to choose representatives. We clarify this concept and develop an index of citizens’ freedom to choose members of parliament as a function of the ballot structure, district magnitude and electoral formulas. Using data from 26 countries, we find that neither proportionality nor the effective number of parties is significantly affected by voters’ freedom of choice. This result has important normative implications for electoral reform.
Autores principais:Pereira, Paulo Trigo
Outros Autores:Silva, João Andrade e
Assunto:Ballot Structure Electoral Index Freedom to Choose Personal Vote
Ano:2009
País:Portugal
Tipo de documento:artigo
Tipo de acesso:acesso aberto
Instituição associada:Universidade de Lisboa
Idioma:inglês
Origem:Repositório da Universidade de Lisboa
Descrição
Resumo:Analysis of the political consequences of electoral laws has emphasized how individual characteristics of the electoral system (electoral formulas, district magnitude, ballot structure) affect the degree of parliament ‘‘fragmentation’’ and proportionality. This paper argues that the personal attributes of representatives are also an important consequence of electoral laws, and that they are in part determined by citizens’ freedom to choose representatives. We clarify this concept and develop an index of citizens’ freedom to choose members of parliament as a function of the ballot structure, district magnitude and electoral formulas. Using data from 26 countries, we find that neither proportionality nor the effective number of parties is significantly affected by voters’ freedom of choice. This result has important normative implications for electoral reform.