Publicação
Heuristics : smart and frugal but also biased
| Resumo: | When it comes to decision-making under uncertainty, there is a well-known confrontation between two approaches: Kahneman and Tversky’s Heuristics and Biases and Gigerenzer’s Fast and Frugal Heuristics. Even though both approaches defend that heuristics correspond to intuitive processes, one postulates systematic and characteristic heuristic-based errors that are costly for individuals and the other refers that heuristics mostly lead to accurate judgments. This present work addresses this apparent paradox: “how can human intuition be simultaneously right and wrong?” by putting together in the same study judgment tasks coming from each theorical approach. One hundred and twenty participants responded to problems presenting a conflict between intuitive (heuristic-based) and deliberate answers (CRT, syllogisms and semantic illusions), commonly used by the heuristics and biases approach; and to a pairwise comparisons task, typically used to study the recognition heuristic by the Fast and Frugal approach. Furthermore, we manipulated instructions to be rational versus intuitive, in order to affect participants’ reliance on intuition. Results show that rational instructions increased performance to conflict problems (i.e., lead to reduced reliance on heuristic-based intuitions) and increased the use of the recognition heuristic. These results defy the view that all heuristics stem from the same intuitive, largely autonomous processes, and suggest that the recognition heuristic also involves a more deliberate type of processing. Limitations and follow up studies are discussed. |
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| Autores principais: | Catarino, Mafalda |
| Assunto: | Heurísticas Intuição Silogismo Teses de mestrado - 2020 |
| Ano: | 2020 |
| País: | Portugal |
| Tipo de documento: | dissertação de mestrado |
| Tipo de acesso: | acesso aberto |
| Instituição associada: | Universidade de Lisboa |
| Idioma: | inglês |
| Origem: | Repositório da Universidade de Lisboa |
| Resumo: | When it comes to decision-making under uncertainty, there is a well-known confrontation between two approaches: Kahneman and Tversky’s Heuristics and Biases and Gigerenzer’s Fast and Frugal Heuristics. Even though both approaches defend that heuristics correspond to intuitive processes, one postulates systematic and characteristic heuristic-based errors that are costly for individuals and the other refers that heuristics mostly lead to accurate judgments. This present work addresses this apparent paradox: “how can human intuition be simultaneously right and wrong?” by putting together in the same study judgment tasks coming from each theorical approach. One hundred and twenty participants responded to problems presenting a conflict between intuitive (heuristic-based) and deliberate answers (CRT, syllogisms and semantic illusions), commonly used by the heuristics and biases approach; and to a pairwise comparisons task, typically used to study the recognition heuristic by the Fast and Frugal approach. Furthermore, we manipulated instructions to be rational versus intuitive, in order to affect participants’ reliance on intuition. Results show that rational instructions increased performance to conflict problems (i.e., lead to reduced reliance on heuristic-based intuitions) and increased the use of the recognition heuristic. These results defy the view that all heuristics stem from the same intuitive, largely autonomous processes, and suggest that the recognition heuristic also involves a more deliberate type of processing. Limitations and follow up studies are discussed. |
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