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Are Our Brains Subcutaneous Machines of Truth-Optimization?

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Detalhes bibliográficos
Resumo:Strategies purporting to determine the meaning of inner states of belief-content in terms of their inferential role usually assume the inner structure of the human inferential competence to be that of first order logic plus identity. Considerations of computational complexity and cumbersomeness of representation tend to undermine the plausibility of combining such strategies with this assumption. In this paper I contend that appealing to rules of default reasoning won’t make things turn out any better for the inferential role functionalist.
Autores principais:Zilhão, António
Assunto:Belief, Meaning Constraints, Inferential Role Semantics, Functionalism, Default Reasoning
Ano:2005
País:Portugal
Tipo de documento:artigo
Tipo de acesso:acesso aberto
Instituição associada:Universidade de Lisboa
Idioma:inglês
Origem:Repositório da Universidade de Lisboa
Descrição
Resumo:Strategies purporting to determine the meaning of inner states of belief-content in terms of their inferential role usually assume the inner structure of the human inferential competence to be that of first order logic plus identity. Considerations of computational complexity and cumbersomeness of representation tend to undermine the plausibility of combining such strategies with this assumption. In this paper I contend that appealing to rules of default reasoning won’t make things turn out any better for the inferential role functionalist.