Publicação
Endogenous timing of moves in an asymmetric price-setting duopoly
| Resumo: | This paper adds to the growing literature on endogenous timing of de- cisions in duopolies. We show for a price-setting duopoly game with sufficiently asymmetric and strictly convex cost functions that the less efficient firm moves first while the more efficient moves second with a higher price than the less efficient firm. |
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| Autores principais: | Tasnádi, Attila |
| Assunto: | Price-setting games Price leadership Dominant firm |
| Ano: | 2003 |
| País: | Portugal |
| Tipo de documento: | artigo |
| Tipo de acesso: | acesso restrito |
| Instituição associada: | Universidade de Lisboa |
| Idioma: | inglês |
| Origem: | Repositório da Universidade de Lisboa |
| Resumo: | This paper adds to the growing literature on endogenous timing of de- cisions in duopolies. We show for a price-setting duopoly game with sufficiently asymmetric and strictly convex cost functions that the less efficient firm moves first while the more efficient moves second with a higher price than the less efficient firm. |
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