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Experimental evidence that quorum rules discourage turnout and promote election boycotts

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Detalhes bibliográficos
Resumo:Many democratic decision making institutions involve quorum rules. Such rules are commonly motivated by concerns about the “legitimacy” or “representativeness” of decisions reached when only a subset of eligible voters participates. A prominent example of this can be found in the context of direct democracy mechanisms, such as referenda and initiatives. We conduct a laboratory experiment to investigate the consequences of the two most common types of quorum rules: a participation quorum and an approval quorum. We find that both types of quora lead to lower participation rates, dramatically increasing the likelihood of full-fledged electoral boycotts on the part of those who endorse the Status Quo. This discouraging effect is significantly larger under a participation quorum than under an approval quorum.
Autores principais:Aguiar-Conraria, Luís
Outros Autores:Magalhães, Pedro; Vanberg, Christoph A.
Assunto:Election design Participation quorum Approval quorum
Ano:2015
País:Portugal
Tipo de documento:artigo
Tipo de acesso:acesso restrito
Instituição associada:Universidade de Lisboa
Idioma:inglês
Origem:Repositório da Universidade de Lisboa
Descrição
Resumo:Many democratic decision making institutions involve quorum rules. Such rules are commonly motivated by concerns about the “legitimacy” or “representativeness” of decisions reached when only a subset of eligible voters participates. A prominent example of this can be found in the context of direct democracy mechanisms, such as referenda and initiatives. We conduct a laboratory experiment to investigate the consequences of the two most common types of quorum rules: a participation quorum and an approval quorum. We find that both types of quora lead to lower participation rates, dramatically increasing the likelihood of full-fledged electoral boycotts on the part of those who endorse the Status Quo. This discouraging effect is significantly larger under a participation quorum than under an approval quorum.